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Does development lead to the establishment of more democratic institutions? The key to the puzzle, we
argue, is the previously unrecognized fact that based on quantitative regime scores, countries over the past
50 years have clustered into two separate, very distinct, yet equally-common stages of political development
— authoritarian states with low levels of freedom on one side and democracies with liberal institutions on the
other side of a bimodal distribution of political regimes. We develop a new empirical strategy — exploiting
exogenous world economic factors and introducing new panel data estimators — that allows for the ﬁrst time
to estimate the eﬀects of development as well as changing unobserved country eﬀects in driving democracy
at these diﬀerent stages of political development. We ﬁnd that income and education have the least eﬀect
on democracy when authoritarian regimes are consolidated and that only changing country eﬀects, possibly
accounting for institutional legacies, can lead to political development. Ironically, it is in highly democratic
and wealthiest of nations that income and education start to play a role; however greater wealth and better
educated citizenry can both help and hurt democracy depending again on what the country’s institutional
legacies are. Far from accepting the notion that much of the developing world is cursed by unchanging and
poor long-run institutions, policy-makers should take note that with democratization we also see changing
country-speciﬁc factors that in turn condition the diﬀerence income and education make for democracy.
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1. Introduction
Western history is often presented as the struggle of freedom and democracy against the forces of authori-
tarian government, going back as far as Herodotus who used this argument to motivate the clash between
the Hellenes and the Persians. Today democracy is also associated with economic prosperity as political and
economic development appear to be positively correlated over long periods of time. The failures of modern
totalitarian regimes in Germany, Russia and China had fueled hope for proponents of democracy, as the
last 50 years have seen stunning changes in the political landscape, from the European colonies achieving
independence to the fall of the Berlin Wall. Yet, a recent report by the Freedom House, a US based non-
governmental organization (NGO), documents the reversal of the trend towards democracy in 38 countries,
particularly in Asia and Africa. Moreover, only two countries, Thailand and Togo have made any progress
towards democracy in recent years. We show in this paper that far from being deﬁned by the growing
dominance of democracy, the second part of the 20th century was characterized by the entrenchment of two
very distinct, yet equally common political regime types — liberal democracy guaranteeing political rights
on one hand and autocracies characterized by poor institutions and lack of political and civil rights on the
other. Analyzing the two most well-known and reliable indicators of regime type for all countries in the
world since the Second World War, we ﬁnd that the distribution of political regimes in the world follows a
bimodal distribution.
The bimodal distribution of regime types in the world has not been previously empirically documented or
explained. In addition to documenting the existence of regime clustering into two opposite types, here we
also show that understanding the causes of the bimodal regime distribution holds the key to answering the
question of whether development can bring about democracy. This question is at the top of international
policy-making agenda, from the World Bank trying to improve institutions that maximize transparency and
accountability to Western governments’ foreign policies emphasizing support for democracy as both a human
rights and an international security imperative. The success of both World Bank and national governments
in promoting democracy in large part rests on discovering whether promoting development can bring about
democracy; here, we will show that this question can be understood by analyzing and explaining why is that
all countries in the world have clustered into two distinct, opposite regime types over the past half century.
While economists have emphasized the importance of democracy stimulating economic growth (Persson and
Tabellini, 1997, 2000, 2003; Persson et. al. 2000), we must also address the question of whether economic
development can stimulate political development. The question of how income aﬀects democracy has only
recently captured the attention of economists. In this paper, we focus on two potential forces of development,
income and education, and assess the extent to which they can facilitate the struggle for civil and political
liberties, as well as the establishment of liberal democratic institutions that preserve those liberties in the
long run. This is relatively unexplored territory for economists, who ﬁrst directed their attention to this
problem after Barro (1999) showed that a number of development indicators such as improvements in living3
standards, especially GDP and education, reduced dependence on natural resources, middle-class share of
income and certain religions aﬃliations are more conducive to democratization. Many of the issues discussed
in this study have been mentioned in some form or another in the vast political science literature of the past
50 years, but were approached from a less quantitative perspective. The earliest systematic formulation of
the connection between political and economic development is due to Lipset (1959, 1963).
To explain the bimodal regime distribution and the underlying eﬀect that development has on this distri-
bution, we had to develop a new empirical strategy that simultaneously solves the problems of (1) reverse
causality given that it is well established that institutions aﬀect development; (2) unobserved heterogeneity
and long-run country-speciﬁc eﬀects given that no set of indicators in any comparative study can account
for all country diﬀerences in institutions, culture and historical legacies that could aﬀect democracy; and
(3) the fact that all existing empirical strategies in the literature can only be used to estimate the eﬀect
of income on the mean of democracy, which may be uninformative given that we demonstrate that regimes
are distributed bimodally. Our empirical strategy involves using three diﬀerent sets of instruments that
identify exogenous variation in income but are presumably not correlated with democracy. Two of these
instruments (geography and trade) have been used in the literature previously, while our third and preferred
set of instruments is based on a new strategy of using shocks to world markets measured by estimating global
factors. We solve the second and third challenges above by designing several new estimators that can enable
us to measure the eﬀect of development at diﬀerent quantiles of democracy distribution, while at the same
time allowing us to identify changing country-speciﬁc factors that stand in for long-run institutions, culture
and historical legacies. Therefore, the entirely new empirical approach is to estimate IV quantile eﬀects as
well as unobserved heterogeneity both at country-speciﬁc and distribution-speciﬁc levels.
The starting point for our study therefore is the ﬁnding that the distributions of two commonly used numerical
measures of democracy are bimodal with most countries concentrated at the extremes. This motivates our
methodology as a departure from traditional mean regression techniques and instead re-orient the topic
of the discussion on the estimation of diﬀerent eﬀects of the variables of interest at diﬀerent quantiles
of the democracy distribution. Adding our three sets of instruments, we identify the eﬀect of economic
development that is stronger in the middle range of the distribution and almost non-existent in the tails.
In practical terms we ﬁnd that economic development has a three to four times larger impact in Latin
America than in Sub-Saharan Africa. This ﬁnding lends support to an emerging focus on so-called “hybrid
democracies,” regimes that have spent years or even decades in-between the period of a collapsed dictatorship
and a full-ﬂedged democracy, including many African, Asian and Eastern European countries after the
fall of communism. Being acutely aware of the diﬃculties typically encountered by applied researchers in
ﬁnding valid instruments, we show that similar results hold when we use a set of geographic instruments,
an instrument based on world trade, and a set of instruments designed to capture world economic factors.
These inverted U-shaped relationships between income and democracy and between schooling and democracy4
over the quantiles of the distribution of democracy are found to be robust to a number of econometric
speciﬁcations.
However, our most signiﬁcant ﬁnding arises only when we estimate changing country-speciﬁc eﬀects. For the
ﬁrst time in the literature, we allow for the estimation of diﬀerent eﬀects that are not only country-speciﬁc
but that furthermore are allowed to vary across the distribution of democracy. We ﬁnd that once we account
for country-speciﬁc eﬀects, the inverted U-shaped relationship described above disappears. In fact, for the
low quantiles of the democracy distribution, the eﬀect of income and schooling on democracy is very close to
zero. Hence, the answer to the question of whether development can promote the establishment of democracy
in autocratic regimes is no.
Having found that country speciﬁc eﬀects matter disproportionately more than economic development in
determining democracy, we ask whether this is uniformly so over the distribution of democracy. The analysis
suggests, however, that the importance of these factors diminishes as countries become more democratic.
Even for democratic countries, however, we ﬁnd evidence of economic development playing a heterogeneous
role, a fact consistent with a large literature emphasizing institutional diﬀerences in modern democracies
(Lijphart, 1999; Hall and Soskice, 2001). Institutional diﬀerences are well known to explain diﬀerent cross-
country diﬀerences in economic performance, particularly in the case of labor market outcomes (Blanchard,
2004). More recently diﬀerences in labor market institutions have been explained by diﬀerences in civic
virtues across countries that jointly determine both political and economic outcomes (Algan and Cahuc,
2008). In this paper, we ﬁnd that the country speciﬁc eﬀects measured by the econometric model are a
combination of long-run institutional factors and contemporary circumstances such as military coups or
constitutional reforms.
Our paper complements the recent quantitative work of Acemoglu et. al. (2008), which analyzes similar
data within the context of a mean regression framework and our ﬁndings are broadly consistent with theirs.
Our quantile regression framework however allows us to explore the same issues from the perspective of
increasingly ﬁne granularity and thus direct the discussion to the role of cross-country heterogeneity and the
extent to which statistical relationships are conditioned by the relative position occupied by a country in the
distribution of democracy.
More than providing ﬁner detail, as we address in our discussion, our ﬁndings call for reorienting the current
debate on income and democracy. Democracy in our analysis emerges as what has been previously termed
a “foundational good”, or what is even better understood as a “foundational institution.” We have in fact
found that all country-speciﬁc, unmeasured eﬀects can change as countries move towards more democratic
regimes. Development has zero eﬀect, but as democracy is established, our evidence suggest that other
long-run institutions, historical legacies and culture change. Far from being ﬁxed and inescapably path
dependent, these country eﬀects can change and open the door for economic development to further aﬀect
political regimes. As countries become democratic, the new set of institutions conditions the role that5
wealth and education can have on democracy. Again, far from having a simple eﬀect, greater wealth can
both promote and retard democracy.
The structure of the paper is as follows. In Section 2, we introduce the data and describe the motivating
puzzle of the bimodal distribution of democracy. Section 3 discusses the basic quantile regression model
and characterizes the estimated inverted U-shaped relationship between income and democracy over the
quantiles of the income distribution. Section 4 extends the analysis to an instrumental variables framework.
Section 5 introduces the two types of unobserved eﬀects and makes the distinction between location and
distributional shifts on the quantities of interest. Section 6 presents evidence on patterns of democracy and
suggests an explanation for the puzzle presented in Section 2. Section 7 concludes. Appendices A and B
provide details on the computational aspects of the estimation methods, and describes the data. The online
appendix available on the Web provides additional robustness checks not reported in this version of the
paper.
2. The Puzzle of the Bimodal Distribution
We employ two measures of democracy for which data is publicly available, the Polity and Freedom House
scores. The Polity (version IV) score, compiled by an academic panel at George Mason University’s Center
for International Development and Conﬂict Management, is deﬁned as the diﬀerence between an index of
autocracy and an index of democracy for each country. Each government is assigned a number between 0
and 10 on each scale based on a set of weighted indicators designed to capture the extent of competitive
political participation, institutionalized constraints on executive power and guarantees of civil liberties and
political participation. The primary focus of the index is on central government and it notably ignores the
extent to which control over economic resources is shared and the interaction between central government
and separatist or revolutionary groups. We use a sample of countries from 1945 to 1999 normalized to range
between 0 and 1.
The Freedom House democracy score is compiled by a New York based NGO founded by Eleanor Roosevelt
and aims to measure the extent of freedom as experienced by individuals. It consists of a rating system
involving 10 political rights and 15 civil liberties questions. The questions cover diverse categories such as
the electoral process, political pluralism and participation, functioning of government, freedom of expression
and belief, associational rights, rule of law and personal autonomy. By design it places greater emphasis on
experienced freedom as opposed to legal guarantees. We employ a sample normalized to a range between 0
and 1. The sample covers the period 1972 to 1999.6
In Table 1 and Table 2, in the online appendix, we list the countries in the Polity sample with their corre-
sponding country codes and sampling periods. The number of observations per country varies substantially
with the inclusion of relatively new countries such as those previously part of the Soviet Union. In Table 3,
in the online appendix, we present the summary statistics for the measures of democracy employed in this
paper disaggregated by geographic regions. In spite of the diﬀerent concepts of democracy that the two mea-
sures are meant to capture, from a purely numerical point of view they show remarkable agreement. As one
would intuitively expect, the mean values for the Western world are about 0.9 while those for Sub-saharan
Africa are only about 0.3. While these two measures rely on a substantial amount of subjectivity, they have
been used extensively in quantitative studies as measures of political freedom (see, e.g., Acemoglu et. al.,
2008; Barro, 1999; Fearon and Laitin, 2003).
On closer consideration of the two measures of democracy, perhaps the most striking feature is their pro-
nounced bimodal distribution as illustrated in Figure 1 for the Polity measure and Figure 2 for the Freedom
House measure. Both distributions have a mode at 1 and another mode at 0.1 and 0.2 respectively. The
near lack of mass at the mean of the distribution invites the question as to the usefulness of mean regression
as a quantitative tool for analyzing the relationship between income and democracy. While we acknowledge
that it is diﬃcult to make inferences based only on the unconditional distribution, we cannot but enquire
whether the relationship between income and democracy diﬀers at diﬀerent quantiles of democracy. Thus,
we shall depart from previous quantitative work on this subject and focus exclusively on results based on a
quantile regression methodology.
Until now, few attempts have been made to explain the puzzle behind the bimodal concentration of political
regimes. Recent work in political science however seems to be consistent with the emphasis we place on
explaining the relationship between income and democracy at diﬀerent quantiles of democracy. Przeworksi
and Limongi (1997) and Przeworski et. al. (2000) argue that countries often become democratic for reasons
which do not appear to be connected to income, but once they are democratic more prosperous countries are
more likely to remain democratic. Epstein et. al. (2006) highlight the importance of “partial democracies”,
countries with fragile democratic status which tend to be volatile and highly heterogeneous. These studies
appear to point out varying mechanism for political development as well a heterogeneous relationship between
economic and political development at diﬀerent stages of democratization.
3. Measuring Quantile Eﬀects
In a typical least-squares regression model approach to the analysis of the relationship between income and
democracy, we focus on estimating the best linear predictor of the conditional expectation of the dependent7
variable,
(3.1) E(Di,t|Ii,t−1,xi,t) = γIi,t−1 + x
′
i,tβ,
where Di,t is the normalized democracy for country i at time t. The income variable Ii,t−1 is measured at
time t − 1. It corresponds to the log of per capita GDP. The parameter γ captures the (marginal) eﬀect of
income on democracy at the mean level. Any additional controls or variables of interest such as education
or population are included in the variables xi,t.
As we discussed in the previous section, the unconditional distribution of income is strongly bimodal with
most countries clustered at the ends of the scale. Thus it seems that an analysis focused on the (conditional)
mean of the distribution might miss important distributional eﬀects of income and that by looking at the
tails of the distribution we may uncover richer evidence. From an econometric point of view, a quantile
regression approach may also be more robust to distributional assumptions on the error term.
3.1. Pooled Quantile Regression Model
We shall direct our attention to the modeling of the τ-th conditional quantile functions of democracy for
country i at time t,
(3.2) QDi,t(τ|Ii,t−1,xi,t) = γ(τ)Ii,t−1 + x′
i,tβ(τ).
By deﬁnition, the τ-th quantile of the distribution of democracy is the value QD(τ) such that Pr(D ≤
QD(τ)) = τ. The quantile τ corresponds to the area under the unconditional distribution of democracy,
bounded by zero on the left and the value QD on the right. Thus, a model estimated at τ = 0.5 will produce
evidence on the eﬀect of income at the median of the democracy distribution. This model, more commonly
known as a Laplace median regression, is often contrasted with the mean regression discussed above. How-
ever, our interest lies in estimating the conditional quantile functions at all quantiles of the distribution of
democracy, paying particular attention to the estimation of the relationship in the tails of the distribution,
that is where τ is close to either 0 or 1.
We will restrict our attention to a linear speciﬁcation of the conditional quantile functions. This model can






ρτ(Di,t − γ(τ)Ii,t−1 − x′
i,tβ(τ)),
using interior point methods. The piecewise linear quantile loss function ρτ(u) is deﬁned as ρτ(u) = (τ1{u >
0}+(1−τ)1{u < 0})|u| following Koenker and Bassett (1978). It can be shown that (γ(τ),β′(τ))′ minimize
E[ρτ(Di,t − γ(τ)Ii,t−1 − x′
i,tβ(τ))]. The above model will be referred to as the pooled quantile regression8
model, for although it is applied to panel data it does not estimate individual speciﬁc eﬀects and further
extensions which will be introduced below.
We focus on quantile regression as an attempt to capture the underlying observed heterogeneity in the rela-
tionship between democracy and its determinants such as income or education. Hence we estimate the rela-
tionship at diﬀerent quantiles of the conditional distribution of democracy for τ ∈ {0.1, 0,25, 0.5, 0.75, 0.9}.
This design measures the eﬀect at each of the three quartiles and also at the ﬁrst and last decile. This allows
us to gain a comprehensive view on how the relationship changes with the distribution of democracy.
It is important to note that quantile regression is not the same as mean regression applied to diﬀerent subsets
of the data ordered by the distribution of the dependent variable. Thus, while we estimate the quantile re-
gression function at the low quantile τ = 0.1 in order to ascertain the extent to which income and education
condition democracy in the lower tail of the distribution of democracy, this is very diﬀerent from estimating
a mean regression where we condition on data in the low tail of the distribution. Thus, QDi,t(0.1|Ii,t−1,xi,t)
is not the same as E(Di,t|Di,t < c,Ii,t−1,xi,t), for some appropriately chosen c meant to capture the lower
tail of the distribution. In particular it may be the case that the above moment does not exist. Furthermore,
there is no theory which tells us how to choose or interpret the parameter c while τ has a natural interpre-
tation. Quantile regression captures the eﬀect of the covariates at a particular quantile of the distribution
of the dependent variable, whereas the above suggested truncated mean regression estimates the conditional
mean in a subsample of the data, ignoring the rest of the distribution of the dependent variable.
In order to facilitate comparisons across model speciﬁcations and econometric procedures we present results
side-by-side in Tables 1, 2 and 3. Since for each speciﬁcation quantile regression delivers not one set of esti-
mates but ﬁve for each of the τ quantiles used, the tables can be interpreted in the following way. Consider
the models presented in Table 1. The ﬁrst model consists of the baseline pooled quantile regression described
above. The model regresses the Polity Measure of democracy on the one period lagged log GDP per capita
and the log population in the current period. The estimated coeﬃcients at each of the quantiles are given
in the ﬁrst ﬁve columns labeled by the corresponding quantiles τ. The last column labeled “Mean” presents
the estimated coeﬃcients of a standard mean regression most closely associated with the quantile regression
procedure employed in the corresponding quantile model. Thus, for the pooled quantile regression setup this
is just OLS on the entire sample. As we shall see below however, once we take the panel data structure into
account we shall employ other procedures such as ﬁxed eﬀects or instrumental variables for both the quantile
regression and the mean regression. Given the fact that quantile regression produces ﬁve sets of coeﬃcient
estimates for every model it is unavoidable to have several related tables which the careful reader will need
to navigate. In addition to containing information on diﬀerent model speciﬁcations each table duplicates the9
results for each of our two variables for the democracy, the Polity Measure and the Freedom House Measure.
As is customary we report standard errors in parenthesis. These were obtained using the bootstrap.5 The
general procedure involves sampling pairs formed of the dependent variable and the set of independent
variables with replacement to accommodate diﬀerent forms of heteroscedasticity. In our panel setting, a
similar strategy is to ﬁrst sample pairs of observations with replacement, and then randomly sample within
groups either with or without replacement. The ﬁrst strategy provides a reliable approximation for the
precision of the estimates when T is relatively large (see, e.g., Davison and Hinkley 1997). The empirical
covariance matrix can be computed given B bootstrap estimates of the coeﬃcients. Due to the already dense
tables required we shall not report signiﬁcance for each quantile coeﬃcient, although the reader can easily
compute the t-statistic in each cell.
3.1.1. An Inverted U-shaped Relationship between Income and Democracy?
We shall now turn our attention to the evidence derived from the use of quantile regression as introduced
above in uncovering the relationship between income and democracy. The pooled quantile regression model
for the Polity measure estimates an inverted U-shaped relationship between income and democracy over the
quantiles of the democracy distribution. Thus in the left tail of the democracy distribution we estimate a
coeﬃcient of 0.006 at the τ = 0.1 quantile. The eﬀect increases to 0.262 at the median of the democracy
distribution and declines to 0.071 in the right tail of the distribution for τ = 0.9. By contrast the coeﬃcient
on lagged GDP per capita is 0.170 if the model is estimated by OLS.
Similarly, if we estimate the same pooled quantile regression model for the Freedom House measure we es-
timate a coeﬃcient of 0.073 at the τ = 0.1 quantile, 0.252 at the median quantile and 0.145 at the τ = 0.9
quantile. The mean eﬀect of log GDP on democracy is 0.183.6
These results suggest that a 10% increase in log GDP per capita increases the democracy score of a country
in the lower tail of the democracy distribution by less than 0.01. Recall that the diﬀerence between the mean
democracy scores of Western countries to that of Sub-saharan countries is over 0.6. Thus, income appears
to have a negligible eﬀect on improving democracy in countries with low democracy scores. On the other
hand the impact of income on democracy is three to four times larger in countries situated at the median
5The bootstrap and alternative resampling methods for cross sectional quantile regression has been investigated,
among others, by Buchinsky (1995), Hahn (1995), Horowitz (1998).
6Note that our estimates of the mean eﬀect are higher than the corresponding values reported in Acemoglu et.
al. (2008). This is due to the diﬀerent model speciﬁcation. We do not include a lagged dependent variable in our
speciﬁcations for reasons that will be discussed in Section 5.4.10
of the democracy distribution. In practical terms this means that a 10% rise in income is likely to have
a much larger impact in Latin America than in Sub-saharan Africa. The results lean towards providing
support for the Epstein et. al. (2006) view that income is a much more potent engine of change in “hybrid
democracies”. In order to verify that this is indeed a quantile eﬀect and not driven simply by the presence
of countries with more unusual characteristics at speciﬁc locations within the distribution of democracy we
also ran a number of speciﬁcations where we excluded certain countries which may be driving this eﬀect.
Thus, we excluded countries in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, certain African countries or
Muslim countries. In every case however we obtained a similar inverse U-shape pattern of the estimated
coeﬃcients even though the composition of the distribution changed. This indicates that the results do in-
deed vary over the distribution of democracy and are not driven by the inclusion of certain groups of countries.
In Table 2 we extend the model by adding a schooling variable corresponding to the percentage of the pop-
ulation in a given year with a secondary education. This reduces the eﬀect of income on democracy at all
quantiles as one would expect given the correlation between income and schooling. In the regressions using
the Polity measure we also estimate an inverse U-shaped relationship between schooling and democracy over
the quantiles. The estimated eﬀect increases from 0.015 at the τ = 0.1 quantile to 0.049 at the median and
decreases to 0.001 at the τ = 0.9 quantile. Similar results are obtained for the Freedom House measure.
The inverse U-shaped relationship was obtained from a pooled quantile regression model. We ought to be
concerned, however, that the estimated relationship is not econometrically robust due to the lack of exoge-
nous variation in income and schooling or due to ignored country speciﬁc heterogeneity. These issues will be
explored in much greater depth in the next sections where we extend the quantile regression model to take
into account endogeneity and diﬀerent speciﬁcations of country eﬀects. Without going into extensive details,
Table 1 and Table 2 also include quantile regression results using instrumental variables and country-speciﬁc
eﬀects.
In the next section we discuss diﬀerent choices of instruments and their relative merits. In Tables 1 and 2 we
use the IV Set 1 which consists of geographic variables traditionally associated with economic development:
mountainous terrain, geographic latitude and the distance to the nearest port. Using these instruments to
account for the potential endogeneity of GDP in the model we estimate the eﬀect of income on democracy
at the previous quantiles. For both measures of democracy, we ﬁnd that qualitatively the results are very
similar. The estimated inverse U shape remains and is in fact more pronounced. Thus, the eﬀect of income
on democracy falls in the low and high quantiles and is higher at the median. For the Polity, measure the
estimated coeﬃcient on the τ = 0.1 quantile changes from 0.06 to 0.02, while for the median it increases
from 0.262 to 0.369. The estimated coeﬃcient on the τ = 0.9 quantile increases slightly from 0.071 to 0.088.11
A similar pattern is observed for the Freedom House measure and for the model that includes schooling.
In order to account for unobserved heterogeneity at the country level we can augment the model by including
country speciﬁc eﬀects. As we will discuss in Section 5, in a panel data quantile regression model country
eﬀects may imply two diﬀerent model speciﬁcations depending on whether they act as a location shift or
distributional shift. The results in Table 1 correspond to a location shift model. We notice immediately
that the inverse U-shape conﬁguration of the estimated eﬀects disappears altogether. In fact, for the Polity
measure the estimated coeﬃcients are 0.001 at the τ = 0.1 quantile, -0.003 at the median and -0.073 at the
τ = 0.9 quantile. Once we add country eﬀects the estimated relationship between income and democracy
disappears at all quantiles.
Although our discussion so far has been focused on point estimates it is important to remark that these
results cannot be explained away by statistical signiﬁcance. For practical considerations we do not discuss
the signiﬁcance of the estimates of the coeﬃcients at every quantile. However, it is easy to see that the
measured inverse U-shape relationship is statistically signiﬁcant for both the pooled quantile regression
model and the IV model as the estimated standard errors are very small at every quantile. The standard
errors increase substantially in the ﬁxed eﬀects model implying that the estimated coeﬃcients on income are
either zero or statistically insigniﬁcant. Similar results hold for the estimated coeﬃcients on the schooling
variable.
4. Instrumental Variables
In the previous section, we have brieﬂy discussed the notion that conditional quantile function of Equation 3.2
may not capture the desired structural relationship if the sampling of income across the sample is independent
of the error term. Thus, both income and democracy may be manifestations of some other latent variable
not expressed in the conditional quantile function. This induces non-random sampling according to the
relationship,
(4.1) Ii,t = δ(xi,t,zi,t,vi,t),
where zi,t is a vector of instrumental variables independent of the structural disturbance but related to in-
come and vi,t is an additional error term correlated with the disturbance of the democracy equation. Thus,
we relax the assumption that income and the individual disturbance are uncorrelated. The idea is familiar
from classical linear econometric techniques where it is known that it leads to biased estimates. Similarly, in
the quantile regression setting the biased sampling induces an endogeneity bias in the estimated coeﬃcients.
This problem can be solved with the aid of additional exogenous variables, known as instruments, which are
independent of the unoberved disturbances but structurally related to income by the above reduced form12
relationship. We follow the method proposed in Chernozhukov and Hansen (2008).
As before we also assume that the conditional quantile relationship is monotonic in τ. The objective function
for the conditional instrumental quantile relationship is given by:




Di,t − γ(τ)Ii,t−1 − x
′
i,tβ(τ) −  (τ)ˆ Ii,t−1
  
,
where ˆ I is obtained as the linear projection of the exogenous variables x and z on the endogenous variable.
The estimation procedure of Chernozhukov and Hansen (2008) proceeds in two steps. First we minimize the
objective function above for β and   as functions of τ and γ,
(4.3)
 
ˆ β(γ,τ), ˆ  (γ,τ)
 
= argminβ,µ R(τ,γ,β, ).
Then we estimate the coeﬃcient on the endogenous income variable by ﬁnding the value of γ, which minimizes
a weighted distance function deﬁned on  :
(4.4) ˆ γ(τ) = argminγ ˆ  (γ,τ)′ˆ Ω(γ)ˆ  (γ,τ),
where ˆ Ω(γ) is the inverse covariance matrix of
√
NT(ˆ  (γ,τ) −  (γ,τ)). Notice that the expression above
implies that the procedure eﬀectively minimizes the Wald statistic of the test  (γ,τ) = 0. So far we have only
discussed the procedure in terms of income as the endogenous variable, but it also applies to speciﬁcations
which include education as an endogenous variable.
As Robinson (2006) remarks, Acemoglu et. al. (2008) are the ﬁrst ones to propose an instrumental variable
approach to the identiﬁcation of the causal eﬀect of income on democracy. Since their proposed instruments
are not uncontroversial we shall explore some alternatives below.
4.1. Geographic Instruments
While the political science literature on democratization seems to have ignored the potential endogeneity
of income in this speciﬁcation, economics has traditionally stressed diﬀerences in geography as a potential
determinant of economic development (Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson, 2005). Geography is thought to
structure the opportunities for material welfare experienced by economic agents. This is particularly salient
in agrarian societies which are heavily dependent upon climate and geography as technological constraints.
Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001) also suggest health as a channel through which geography inﬂu-
ences economic development. Many diseases like malaria are only found in certain areas of the world with
devastating eﬀects on economic development.
We use the log of mountainous terrain, geographic latitude and the log of air distance to the nearest port as
our instrumental variables set I. This set of instruments was used to derive the results described above. It13
is designed to be a ﬁrst approach to dealing with endogeneity within the context of this model.
While these instruments are arguably correlated with GDP per capita, the correlation might be weak.
Furthermore, if we are prepared to assume that geography determines the economic choice set available to
an individual it is easy to extrapolate that it also shapes the political landscape by inﬂuencing political
preferences. Thus, geography might not provide us with adequate instruments after all.
4.2. Trade-Weighted World Income Instrument
Acemoglu et. al. (2008) use two diﬀerent instruments for income in their linear speciﬁcation. The ﬁrst
instrument corresponds to the savings rate in the previous ﬁve-year period. While we agree that it is
diﬃcult to ﬁnd a priori reasons why the savings rate would aﬀect democracy, it is nevertheless conceivable
that the two variables are correlated, especially in developing countries. Hence we only use the second
instrument, the trade-weighted world income. Let ωi,j denote the trade share between country i and j in
the GDP of country i between 1980-1989. Then we can write the income of country i at time t − 1 as,




where income is measured as log of total income. Acemoglu et. al. (2008) suggest the use of the weighted
sum of world income for each country, ˆ Ii,t−1 as an instrument. Notice that the weights are not estimated
but correspond to the actual trade weights. This instrument may be problematic if income in country j,
Ij,t−1, is correlated with democracy in country j which itself is then correlated to democracy in country i.
Furthermore, the trade weights, ωi,j may be correlated with the relative democracy scores of countries i and
j. We know that more democratic countries tend to be more open to trade. Furthermore, there may be
political economy reasons why countries prefer to trade with countries which have similar political regimes.
In this sense it might not be very surprising that Iran and Cuba have preferential trade agreements in place.
4.3. Global Economic Factors
The world income instrument described above has an appealing interpretation since it is designed to cap-
ture the intuition that business cycles are to some extent correlated with events in world markets. Trade
reﬂects only one aspect of this international dimension. Recently, Harding (2008) argued that the stochastic
dimension of an economy is potentially rather large and thus numerous global factors that have a substantial
impact on a given economy could be identiﬁed. A statistical factor model can be employed to recover a set
of orthogonal factors that can act as international sources of domestic economic ﬂuctuations (Kose et. al.,
2003). These global factors drive, to some extent, the domestic business cycle independently of the political
regime of a country.14
Econometrically, we can write the following linear factor model for income:
(4.6) It−1 = ΛFt−1 + Ut−1,
where It−1 is the observed N dimensional vector of log GDP, Ft−1 is a p-dimensional vector of global factors
and Ut−1 is a vector of idiosyncratic errors. The coeﬃcient matrix Λ is a matrix of individual speciﬁc
weights (factor loadings). Since only log GDP is observed we need to use a statistical procedure such as
Principal Components Analysis (PCA) applied to the covariance matrix Σ = (1/T)It−1I′
t−1 to recover the
latent factors ˆ Ft−1.
By construction, this method separates the commonalities Ft−1 from the idiosyncratic shocks Ut−1. In order
to further exclude the possibility that the political regime aﬀects the global factors through its eﬀect on
income we construct diﬀerent values of the instruments for each country by excluding the country from the
analysis. Thus, the instruments for country j correspond to the global factors estimated from the matrix of
GDP measures for all the countries in the world except country j.7
In many ﬁnancial applications it is of interest to know the exact number of factors (Bai and Ng, 2002; Harding,
2008; Stock and Watson, 2002). This issue is substantially complicated by the fact that for persistent time
series such as GDP, the latent factors often have a dynamic structure. If this fact is not accounted for a
plain application of PCA will recover both the factors and their lags under certain identiﬁcation criteria on
their strength relative to the variance of the noise (Harding, 2007). In the present case, we can ignore this
debate since we only employ the estimated factors as instruments. The estimated factors are not directly
interpretable since they correspond to combinations of many diﬀerent economic fundamentals operating at
the global level. Nevertheless, they are valid instruments and can be employed in the instrumental variable
speciﬁcation of our model.
Basic statistics of the instruments are presented in Table 3, in the online appendix. While it is not necessary
nor feasible to interpret the proposed instruments in a concrete economic setting, it is interesting to note
that the chosen principal components have similar statistical properties across world regions. The ﬁrst
factor appears to be more important for Western democracies, while the second factor for Sub-saharan
African countries. Similarly the fourth factor appears less important for Eastern Europe and the Soviet
Union. This is consistent with the notion that we are capturing global economic factors acting as sources
for the transmission of international business cycles while still expecting regional variation in their impact.
4.4. Robustness to Instrument Choice
In Table 3 and Figure 3 we present the estimation results for the baseline pooled model after we instrument
for income with one of our three sets of instruments. The left panels in Figure 3 compare the estimated
7We have also experimented with excluding all countries in the geographic region to which j belongs in the
construction of the instrument for j but have obtained very similar results.15
quantile eﬀects of income on democracy between the quantile regression (QR) estimator corresponding to
the pooled model and the instrumental variable (IV S1-3) estimators corresponding to the instrumental
variable quantile regression estimators using the three sets of instruments. In Table 3 we report results for
τ = {0.1,0.25,0.5,0.75,0.9}. Several of the estimated coeﬃcients at the 0.9 quantile, however, are zero,
which makes us doubt that the instrumental variable estimator worked for this quantile. For computational
robustness, we restrict our attention in Figure 3 to twelve quantiles between 0.2 and 0.8. We believe that
some of the other estimated nil eﬀects can also be explained as computational limitations. However, results
appear fairly robust, at least from a computational point of view between the 0.2 and 0.8 quantiles.
For both measures of democracy, estimation using the ﬁrst set of instruments, correspondingto the geographic
variables, only ampliﬁes the inverted U-shaped relationship as described in the previous section. The second
set, corresponding to the trade weighted world income instrument, only replicates these results for the lower
half of the distribution. The estimated coeﬃcients for the high quartiles are higher than at the median.
For the Polity measure the estimated coeﬃcient increases from 0.261 to 0.302 while for the Freedom House
measure it increases from 0.136 to 0.170 at the τ = 0.75 quantile.
If we now employ our last set of proposed instruments, we ﬁnd that the inverted U-shape relationship is
preserved for the Polity measure but not for the Freedom House measure. The estimates for the Polity
measure are slightly lower than those for the pooled quantile model and almost 50% smaller than those
obtained using the ﬁrst set of geographic instruments. The corresponding relationship for the Freedom
House measure, however, estimated a very high impact of income at high quantiles of democracy. Overall,
it predicts an increasing relationship between income and democracy over the quantiles.
While we have obtained mixed results under the diﬀerent instrumentation strategies, it appears that most
speciﬁcations preserve the inverse U-shaped relationship between income and democracy at diﬀerent quantiles
of democracy. The diﬀerent speciﬁcations appear to disagree mostly on the eﬀect of income in the high
quantiles. However all speciﬁcations, appear to conﬁrm a positive eﬀect of income on democracy in the
middle range of the democracy distribution. All but one speciﬁcation estimate a lower eﬀect of income on
democracy in the low quantiles compared to the median. Thus, after implementing three diﬀerent strategies
addressing the potential endogeneity of income, we still ﬁnd higher income to be a more important force for
democratization in “hybrid regimes” close to the median of the democracy distribution and to have almost
no eﬀect in non-democratic regimes.
5. Panel Data
We have attempted to estimate the structural eﬀect of income on democracy using a number of instrumental
variables strategies. Acemoglu et. al. (2008) show, in the context of linear regression, that this might be
insuﬃcient in the presence of long run unobserved institutional factors which condition the equilibrium paths16
of both economic and political development. This challenges the notion that a small set of contemporary
explanatory variables such as income or population can do a good job at explaining the distribution of
democracy around the world. As we anticipated in Section 3.1.1, if we augment our econometric speciﬁcation
with country speciﬁc eﬀects, we are going to ﬁnd that the inverted U-shaped relationship breaks down. In
this section we will explore this eﬀect in greater detail.
First however, let us provide some preliminary evidence on the persistence of the bimodal distribution of
income even after conditioning on income and schooling. To this eﬀect, we construct the (kernel smoothed)
conditional density of democracy for each of the two measures of democracy. The two conditioning variables
are income and schooling. In Figure 4 we compare the unconditional and conditional distributions for the
two measures of democracy and for three partitions of the conditioning variables, “low,” “median” and
“high.” These partitions are chosen based on the quantiles of the respective variables. Thus, when we
compute f(D|Low I), we compute the distribution of democracy conditional on income being below the
25th percentile. Similarly, “high” corresponds to the conditioning variable being above the 75th percentile
with the remaining mass allocated to the “median.”
As can be seen from Figure 4, in almost all cases, the conditional distribution of democracy retains its bimodal
shape after conditioning on income and schooling. Income and schooling are only partially able to explain
the observed shape. Consider for example the distribution of the Polity measure in the ﬁrst row of Figure 4.
Notice the change in the distribution of democracy as we ﬁrst condition on low income. The unconditional
distribution has the bimodal shape discussed above. After conditioning we ﬁnd the frequency of country-
years with low democracy scores increasing while the frequency of country-years with high democracy scores
decreasing. The bimodal shape remains, illustrating the fact that even after conditioning on low income we
still ﬁnd countries with both high and low scores of democracy. Similarly, when we condition on high income
we ﬁnd a higher frequency of country-years with a high democracy score but also a substantial number with
low democracy scores. This pattern is repeated throughout the panels in Figure 4.
This points to the possible existence of more long run inﬂuences that shape the political development of a
country and which is not susceptible to the contemporaneous eﬀects of income and schooling but itself may
determine these. As previously hinted, we will attempt to use panel data methods to control for these forces.
5.1. Location Shifts
The simplest possible quantile model which allows for ﬁxed eﬀects is given by the following equation for the
τ-th conditional quantile functions of democracy for country i at time t,
(5.1) QDi,t(τ|Ii,t−1,xi,t, i) = γ(τ)Ii,t−1 + x
′
i,tβ(τ) +  i.17
This extends the standard pooled model discussed above by allowing for an individual speciﬁc eﬀect  i, which
does not vary across quantiles. These eﬀects should be simply interpreted as country-speciﬁc intercepts that
shift the conditional quantiles functions by   at each quantile. We call this model the location-shift quantile









ωjρτj(Di,t − γ(τj)Ii,t−1 − x
′
i,tβ(τj) −  i),
using the method described in Koenker (2004). The weights ωj control the inﬂuence of the j-th quantile on
the estimation of the quantile eﬀects. In the present study, we will employ equal weights 1/J.
If we now turn our attention to Figure 3, we can evaluate the plots of the quantile eﬀect of income on
democracy at diﬀerent quantiles after we estimate individual speciﬁc eﬀects. (The interested reader can see
the online appendix for a similar analysis based on schooling). The ﬁgure reveals that once we add country
eﬀects the inverted U-shaped relationship disappears. This result is consistent with the mean regression
results of Acemoglu et. al. (2008), who also ﬁnd that once country eﬀects are added to the speciﬁcation the
relationship between income and democracy disappears. Within the context of quantile regression however,
we can take the analysis a step further and investigate the nature of the country eﬀects. If we associate
diﬀerent political outcomes with diﬀerent sets of long run institutions, we can ask the question whether these
institutions have the same impact at diﬀerent quantiles of the democracy distributions.
5.2. Distributional Shifts
In large T panel data it is possible to estimate a diﬀerent value of the individual eﬀect for each quantile of
the conditional distribution of the response. This is a novel opportunity which allows us to evaluate the role
of the country eﬀect, and by implication the long run drivers of democracy which it proxies for, as they vary
over the distribution of democracy. To our knowledge this is the ﬁrst time that distributional country eﬀects
have been employed in empirical work. To introduce the concept, let us ﬁrst estimate a quantile group eﬀect
before proceeding with the estimation of country speciﬁc eﬀects.
The model of interest for the τ-th conditional quantile function of democracy for country i at time t in the
presence of group eﬀects is,
(5.3) QDi,g,t(τ|Ii,g,t−1,xi,g,t, i,g) = γ(τ)Ii,g,t−1 + x′
i,g,tβ(τ) +  i,g(τ).
We can allocate each country to a group g based on the quartiles of the distribution of the mean value
of a country’s variable of interest. Thus, for example we can divide the countries into four groups based
on average schooling, “low,” ”middle-low,” “middle-high,” and “high.” A similar grouping can be done for
income. We also consider two variables meant to capture the presence of long run institutions based on the18
work of Acemoglu et. al. (2008). These correspond to estimated settler mortality and population density in
1500. In Tables 5 and 6, in the online appendix, we present the composition of each of the four groups for
the four variables of interest for all countries for which data was available.
In Figure 5, we present the plots of the estimated quantile group eﬀects for the ﬁrst three groups using
the “high” group as reference point. In each graph, the continuous dotted line shows the point estimates,
and the shaded region represents a 95% conﬁdence interval for the point estimates. The estimate group
eﬀect for the “low” schooling group is negative but has a positive slope over the quantiles of the democracy
distribution. The group eﬀect for the “middle-low” group is also negative but closer to zero than the eﬀect
for the “low” group. Both group eﬀects are statistically signiﬁcant at all quantiles. The estimated group
eﬀects for the “middle-high” schooling group are very close to zero and statistically insigniﬁcant. This shows
that the presence of individual eﬀects is much more pronounced for low schooling countries and that the
eﬀect of these long run factors diminishes for more democratic countries. This shows that there is substantial
heterogeneity impacting country speciﬁc eﬀects on democracy.
If we now group the countries by income we ﬁnd a similar pattern to the one where we group the countries
by schooling. The eﬀect is negative and signiﬁcant only for low income countries in the lower quantiles
of the democracy distribution. Additionally we ﬁnd positive signiﬁcant quantile group eﬀects for countries
with “low” and “middle-low” settler mortality but no signiﬁcant group eﬀects for countries with diﬀerent
population densities in 1500.
This analysis strongly suggests that country speciﬁc eﬀects are not likely to be uniformly important for
all countries in the sample. Moreover their signiﬁcance diminishes as countries become more democratic.
The impact of country heterogeneity is likely to be very mixed. The impact of long run factors is likely
to be stronger in countries with both a challenging past and unfortunate present economic and historical
circumstances, but that once a country overcomes the eﬀect of bad initial conditions these long run factors
will diminish in importance.
In order to explore this point further, we can now proceed to estimate individual quantile eﬀects for all
countries. The τ-th conditional quantile function of democracy for country i at time t in the presence of
individual eﬀects is,
(5.4) QDi,t(τ|Ii,t−1,xi,t, i) = γ(τ)Ii,t−1 + x′
i,tβ(τ) +  i(τ).
We call this model the distributional-shift country eﬀects quantile regression model (labeled FEQR (DS)
in the ﬁgures). Notice that we now estimate a series of individual eﬀects, one for each quantile, for every
country. The procedure requires the estimation of N country speciﬁc eﬀects and thus is only feasible for
large T. For identiﬁcation purposes, we estimate a model without an intercept term. This model can also
easily be extended to the instrumental variable case for each of the three sets of instruments employed in
this paper (labelled IVFE-S1 through IVFE-S3).19
In Figure 3, we compare the estimated coeﬃcients for income across quantiles with the results we obtained
from our previous models. In most speciﬁcations, the estimated coeﬃcients on income and schooling are
close or identical to zero. The lack of a statistical relationship is particularly emphasized at low quantiles
for τ < 0.5. Depending on the chosen speciﬁcation and the instruments used, we ﬁnd some variation at
the high quantiles. However, this is not very robust and the estimated coeﬃcients are close to zero even
though they can take both negative and positive values at the high quantiles. Results appear consistent
across the diﬀerent sets of instruments. Results based on the ﬁrst set of geographic instruments are rather
diﬀerent from the results employing the other sets of instruments. It appears to ﬁnd a downward sloping
relationship between income and democracy over the diﬀerent quantiles of the distribution. The other two
sets of instruments appear to predict almost no eﬀect of income on democracy over the quantiles.
Allowing the individual eﬀects  i’s to have a distributional shift does not appear to change the estimated
coeﬃcients on the right hand side variable but does potentially provide us with more information on the
heterogeneous impact of the long run country speciﬁc factors they are designed to capture.
In Figures 6, we plot the country eﬀects estimates for the models of Polity measure of democracy. The results
for the Freedom House democracy score were similar and therefore can be found in the online appendix. We
only plot the results for countries with at least one individual eﬀect signiﬁcant the at 1% level. All eﬀects
are however estimated and point-wise conﬁdence intervals are computed at each quantile
To our knowledge this is the ﬁrst time such plots have been employed. Thus, there is no established
tradition in interpreting them. Quantile country eﬀects, which are allowed to vary over the distribution of
the dependent variable, are estimated at all quantiles. This is the case even when a particular country does
not vary in its position in the distribution of democracy overtime. For example we estimate a quantile country
eﬀect which varies with τ for the US even though the US scored at the very top of both democracy measures
throughout the sample. This feature is rather counterintuitive even though it appears to be mathematically
correct. It is challenging to interpret what exactly is identiﬁed in a situation where the dependent variable
does not change over time for one country. Mathematically, the quantity is identiﬁed as long as income and
population change over time. Notice that the objective function for quantile regression involves minimization
over terms in ρτj(Di,t − γ(τ)Ii,t−1 − x′
i,tβ(τ) −  i(τ)). Thus, even though Di,t is constant over time, the
term Di,t −γ(τ)Ii,t−1 −x′
i,tβ(τ) is not. Moreover, notice that γ(τ) and β(τ) are constrained to be the same
across countries i while  i(τ) alone varies across countries. For low quantiles, we have seen before that the
eﬀect of income (and other regressors such as population) is likely to be close to zero. Thus, the estimation
algorithm will try and “match”  i(τ) with Di,t. Thus, that τ-th quantile of democracy should be similar to
the country eﬀect  i. Because we estimate a model without an intercept for identiﬁcation, we thus expect
the estimated quantile country eﬀect to be close to 1 for countries such as the US which don’t vary over time
and for which we estimate the quantile eﬀect at low quantiles. This is indeed the pattern that we observe20
in Figure 6. The evidence in Figure 6 on individual eﬀects is thus consistent with the claim that income is
particularly ineﬀective at explaining political outcomes in the lower quantiles of the democracy distribution.
In all cases however, the eﬀect of country speciﬁc eﬀects diminishes and is estimated with wider error
margins at high quantiles. While we were not able to obtain robust estimates across diﬀerent econometric
speciﬁcations of the eﬀects of income and schooling at high quantiles, our earlier results point to the presence
of some eﬀect. We believe that this is due to additional heterogeneity in the way income and schooling
aﬀect countries at the same quantile. Intuitively, this suggests that income and education play a very
diﬀerent role in countries with similar levels of political development which are not adequately captured
by ﬁtting a common structural equation for the quantile. Econometrically, it is not possible within the
conﬁnes of our data to estimate a random coeﬃcients model that would allow for additional heterogeneity
though country speciﬁc slope parameters at each quantile. While additional elaboration of this point is
beyond the scope of our paper, we should remark that a vast literature exists in political science on the
institutional diﬀerences between democracies with similar ranks on the democracy scales employed in the
analysis. Lijphart (1999) documents the institutional heterogeneity in 36 democracies by means of ten
variables arguing for a split between “majoritarian” and “consensus” democracies based on the extent to
which political power is concentrated or shared. These democracies tend to be rather diﬀerent in their
approach to the management of the economy or the welfare state. If Lijphart (1999) is correct, then income
and schooling have very diﬀerent eﬀects in democracies even though superﬁcially these democracies appear
rather similar in our rankings. Similarly, the literature on “varieties of capitalism” (Hall and Soskice, 2001)
documents a wide range of diﬀerences in the political economies of developed nations. To conclude, we
believe that the evidence in this paper points to a diminished impact of long run country speciﬁc eﬀects for
observations in the upper tail of the democracy distribution and to additional heterogeneity in the eﬀect of
income and schooling for these observations. And hence, while our data does not allow us to study these
additional diﬀerences, we do not want to diminish its importance in future research.
We can compare the estimated individual eﬀects across countries at a given quantile. This provides us with
additional information on the heterogeneous impact of long run factors at diﬀerent quantiles. In Figures
7 and 8, we plot the estimated quantile country eﬀects for the 0.3 and 0.7 quantiles, ˆ  i(0.3) and ˆ  i(0.7),
against the corresponding mean values for democracy for each country. Plots against schooling and income
can be found in the online appendix. Furthermore, in each ﬁgure we report six scatter plots, where for ease
of interpretation, we have grouped the countries into six regions.
First, let us notice that the ﬁgures in the online appendix reveal the estimated quantile country eﬀects
to be uncorrelated with income or schooling in the sense that within each region countries tend to have
comparable levels of income and schooling but very diﬀerent estimated country speciﬁc eﬀects. Figures 7
and 8 show a high degree of correlation between the country-speciﬁc mean democracy score as measured by
the Polity database and the estimated quantile eﬀects. This is to be expected since, as we have previously21
seen, in many cases the country speciﬁc eﬀects capture most of the variation. In particular, notice how this
correlation is very high at the 0.3 quantile, since in the left tail of the democracy distribution the quantile
eﬀect of income and schooling is close to zero. For the 0.7 quantile, however, the correlation is less perfect
due to the eﬀect of the structural component of the quantile function. While the results do not appear to
be very robust, income, schooling and population play a role here, making the country speciﬁc eﬀects less
important. Furthermore, note the diﬀerent scales for the estimated country eﬀects ˆ  i(0.3) and ˆ  i(0.7). The
estimate ˆ  i(0.3) ranges between 0 and 1, which is consistent with the observation that when the explanatory
variables play almost no role in the quantile function, the country speciﬁc quantile eﬀects will explain all
the variation in the dependent variable. If we now look at the range of the quantile eﬀect ˆ  i(0.7), we notice
that they range between -0.6 and 0.6. Since our democracy scores range between 0 and 1 this appears to
suggest that at most 40% of the democracy score may be captured by the included variables while the rest
is due to the country speciﬁc quantile eﬀects.
5.3. Further Robustness Checks
In this paper, we have employed a wide array of quantile estimation techniques which provide a thorough
exploration of the degree to which our results are robust to diﬀerent econometric speciﬁcations. The results
presented in this paper focus on three main explanatory variables: income, schooling and population. An
earlier version of this paper also explores additional variables such as economic growth, oil production,
ethnicity or religion. We have not found these to aﬀect the results substantively and for reasons of conciseness
we are not reporting them here.
There are a couple of important diﬀerences in the way the data was employed in our paper compared to
Acemoglu et. al. (2008). First, we use annual data rather than 5-year panels. We replicate some of the
basic regression estimates for the pooled, instrumental variables and country eﬀects models using the 5-
year panel data of Acemoglu et. al. (2008). We obtain very similar coeﬃcient estimates across quantiles.
In particular we also estimate an inverted U-shaped relationship between income and democracy for the
pooled and instrumental variables models, which disappears as soon as individual eﬀects are added to the
speciﬁcation. We chose to estimate the model on annual data even though democracy is a slowly moving
process in order to be able to estimate quantile country eﬀects more precisely. The resulting point estimates
however are very similar. These results are not reported in this version of the paper, but are available for
the interested reader in the online appendix.
However, we do depart from the approach of Acemoglu et. al. (2008) in a crucial way. We do not estimate
a dynamic model, i.e., we do not include a lagged measure of democracy on the right hand side of our
speciﬁcation. The inclusion of a lagged dependent variable in quantile regression models has not been
explored so far in the econometric literature. Lacking a theoretical econometric foundation to deal with
dynamics in this context, we decided to avoid this issue in the present paper. There is no immediate way22
of implementing a dynamic setting as we cannot separately identify the country idiosyncratic eﬀect. We do
conduct one additional robustness check, however. In the online appendix, we provide additional evidence on
the distributional eﬀect of income on democracy by limiting the sample to countries with positive standard
deviation of democracy. If an estimator for dynamic panel data would be available for quantile regression
then it could at most be applied to this subset. We ﬁnd very similar results for this subset of the data.
In particular notice the inverted U-shaped dependence for the pooled and instrumental variable estimators
which disappears once we include country eﬀects. In any case, the inclusion of a lagged dependent variable
is not likely to increase the chances of ﬁnding income or schooling as signiﬁcant driving forces for democracy
in our model. By analogy, in mean regression settings, lagged dependent variables absorb much of the time
variation especially for slow moving processes such as democracy.
6. Patterns of Democracy
By focusing on the scatter plots for the quantile country eﬀects in Figures 7 and 8, as well as Figures 6
to 9 in the online appendix, we can learn more about the patterns of political development in the world.
While some variation is explained by the included variables such as income, schooling and population, their
eﬀect appears not to be robust or consistent across most econometric speciﬁcations. The scatter plots for
the country eﬀects may provide some guidance to the unexplained variation in democratic and authoritarian
rule across the world.
Western Democracies and Japan corresponds to the region of consolidated modern democracies. However,
even here we observe great diversity over the second half of the 20th century. While sharing similar levels
of economic development, not all European countries have shared an equally democratic past over the last
50 years. Notice in particular how the estimated quantile country eﬀects for Portugal and France are
substantially lower at the 0.3 quantiles than at the 0.7 quantiles. This reﬂects the fact that at some point
over the last 50 years these countries have experienced periods of authoritarian government. Portugal’s
ﬁrst attempts at democracy was the establishment of a republic in 1910 that collapsed under economic
pressures and led to the establishment of a right-wing military dictatorship by Antonio de Oliviera Salazar.
Democracy was reintroduced in 1974 after another left-wing military coup. While France did not experience a
dictatorship, its institutions changed drastically at the conclusion of the Algerian war when President Charles
De Gaulle established the Fifth Republic in 1958. The constitutional reforms ended what was considered
a Parliamentary system and established a semi-presidential system of government by strengthening the
institution of the Presidency. Additionally, France experienced perhaps the most turbulent social protests
of any European country in the late 1960s, as student strikes dominated Paris. The estimated quantile
individual eﬀects capture the idiosyncracies of these regimes in Europe after the end of World War II. By
estimating diﬀerent country eﬀects for diﬀerent quantiles we are implicitly allowing for time variation in the
“ﬁxed” eﬀects. This challenges the association of these eﬀects with long run development paths that jointly23
determine both political and economic development. The evidence provided by the quantile country eﬀects
appears to underline the idiosyncracy of a country’s development. The quantile eﬀects are capturing this
idiosyncracy as a mixture of long run factor and contemporary shocks not adequately controlled for by the
included variables.
We can learn more about the patterns of political development in other countries in the world by focusing on
the conditional quantiles of the model 5.4. To obtain the quantiles of democracy for each country, we evaluate
the estimated model at the country-speciﬁc mean of log of GDP and log of population. Figure 9 presents the
conditional and unconditional quantiles of democracy in several countries representing diﬀerent regions of
the world. In all the cases, we see that the vertical distance between the Polity measure of democracy and the
prediction is relatively small, suggesting that the panel data model oﬀers a satisfactory way of estimating the
country-speciﬁc distribution of democracy. This ﬁgure also shows the relative limitation of the conditional
mean approach, only providing acceptable predictions for the somewhat “degenerated” cases (e.g., US, and
Botswana).
Greece and Spain reﬂect the fact that at some point these countries have experienced periods of non-
democratic regimes. Their estimated democracy levels at the lowest quantiles are comparable to the less
advanced democracies in the world, but the levels at the highest quantiles are comparable to the more
established democracies. Greece emerged from the 19th century as an established monarchy which continued
until 1967 when a military dictatorship arose. The junta faced popular opposition and international pressure
and democratic elections were held in 1974. Spain, while now a constitutional monarchy with a responsive
democratic government, was mired under the repressive regime of General Francisco Franco for a thirty-six
year stretch from 1939 and 1975. Franco was a product of a nationalist movement which allied the fascist
right with the anti-left middle class during the 1930’s and then survived through support from Hitler and
Mussolini even though oﬃcially neutral during World War II.
In sum, when considering the implication of our results for developed democracies, our model is able both
to correctly predict the level of democracy and to explain a high level of diverse paths to consolidated
democracy that Western European countries have taken. Most importantly, our estimated country-speciﬁc
eﬀects identify the set of South European countries, in addition to France, that has long occupied the
attention of those studying democratization (Schmitter et al. 1986, Huntington 1993, Linz and Stepan
1996). However, at the same time we have also explained the political development in traditional liberal
consolidated democracies, whose institutions changed very little over the past century. Our quantile country-
speciﬁc eﬀects approach is equivalent to counterfactual analysis, which allowed us to estimate the factors
driving democracy even given the tight clustering of economically developed democracies in Western Europe.
Eastern Europe and the former USSR is the region of the world where present-day country-speciﬁc factors
are most easily recognized as reﬂecting a legacy of communist institutions. This region has been especially
important for students of democracy because of the stark divergence of institutional change following the24
fall of communism. Contrary to original hopes of democratic leaders, the ﬁrst decade of the post-communist
experience in the region saw more countries slide back to authoritarianism than establish consolidated democ-
racies. Our results explain this eﬀect both through the nonlinear eﬀects that income and education have,
and through changing country-speciﬁc eﬀects. In all our scatterplots of country-speciﬁc eﬀects, the Czech
Republic and the Baltic states cluster in the upper-right hand corners. Both according to the level of de-
velopment and to the underlying cultural and historical legacies, these countries have been identiﬁed by
scholars of the region as the best candidates for future democratic consolidation (McFaul and Stoner-Weiss
2004, Ekiert and Hanson, 2003). In contrast, former republics of the Soviet Union other than the Baltic
states have had a remarkably diﬃcult transitional period in the 1990s. Our analysis reveals this not only the
eﬀect of low income or educational attainment, both of which characterize states such as Kazakhstan and
Uzbekistan, but also an eﬀect of country-speciﬁc factors that in this case capture institutional legacies of
the particularly oppressive form of communism that Stalin instituted following the occupation of these areas
after the Second World War. Experts on the region have also identiﬁed the unique Soviet-style system of
party elite rule to be an obstacle to building eﬀective institutions of party competition (Jones-Luong 2002,
2003).
Our data also identiﬁes Russia under Boris Yeltsin as falling on the opposite end of the spectrum from the
developed democracies when it comes to country-speciﬁc factors. Because of the persistence of country-
speciﬁc factors across diﬀerent quantiles of democracy, Russia much like China represents a country where
democratization is likely to encounter greatest obstacles. This ﬁnding is signiﬁcant in that it corresponds
to the turbulent institutional change in Russia not only in the 1990s but also in the period that followed,
described by numerous studies of Yeltsin and Vladimir Putin’s rule of the country (McFaul 2002a, McFaul
2002b, Fish 2005, Colton and Holmes 2007, Politkovskaya 2007, Shevtsova 2007a, 2007b, Colton 2008).Most
of these authors ascribe the failure of democracy in Russia to a lack of political order and well-functioning
institutions; but the problem that our analysis identiﬁes is that even in the counterfactual scenario of having
a developed democracy in Russia (better than 70 percent of the rest of the world’s regimes), the country-
speciﬁc factors that existed under the communists will persist. Another way of interpreting this ﬁnding is
that changing country-speciﬁc factors such as historical legacies and the institutions of the state are unlikely
to result in a consolidated democracy in Russia.
The Balkans illustrate perhaps the most interesting role of country-speciﬁc factors. When we allow country-
speciﬁc factors to vary according to quantiles of income, we identify Albania and Romania forming a unique
cluster, at the very opposite end from the Baltic countries discussed above. This result is consistent with
the fact that the two countries experienced two of the bloodiest communist dictatorships in Europe. In
Romania, despite its high growth rates in the period we studied, Nicolae Ceausescu’s dictatorship destroyed
entire segments of Romania’s civil society, culture and state institutions. The brutality of Ceausescu’s regime
sparked the Europe’s ﬁrst bloody postcommunist revolution on December 22, 1998, when Ceausescu together25
with his wife Elena was shot by a ﬁring squad. The violent end of the communist dictatorship in Romania,
however, did not lead to the establishment of democracy. As Grzymala-Busse’s (2002) work in the region has
uncovered, the systems of patronage and clientalism persisted throughout the 1990s, limiting the eﬀectiveness
of the party system in Romania and representing what our study has identiﬁed to be country-speciﬁc factors
obstructing institutional change. Similarly, in Albania, until his death in 1985, Enver Hoxha ran a police
state that not only suppressed dissent but also systematically dismantled the set of state and civil society
institutions necessary for democracy. While Romania and Albania are extreme examples of the destructive
communist legacies, weak civil society in particular has been an important obstacle to the quality of all new
post-communist democracies (Howard 2003).
Even more so than in Albania and Romania, the most extreme case of destruction of democracy-supporting
institutions and culture can be found in Yugoslavia. Dating back to its establishment in 1918, the country’s
changing authoritarian governments — starting with Serbian kings and ending with the Socialist Party —
failed to resolve ongoing ethnic diﬀerences that culminated in bloody civil wars in Croatia (1991-1995), Bosnia
(1992-1995) and Kosovo (1996-1999). What our analysis identiﬁes as country-speciﬁc factors historians of
the region such as Ivo Banac (1988) have explored in much greater depth. Banac (1998) explains why and
how the question of nationalism emerged in Yugoslavia and how it was engineered and manipulated by ethnic
leaders into a uniquely virulent strain of a destructive political ideology. The uniqueness of the Yugoslav
case as a total dissolution of the state and a failure of institutional change is most starkly apparent in the
volumes of court documents and eye-witness accounts that are now part of the historical record of the Hague
Tribunal that indicted the country’s ethic leaders for genocide and crimes against humanity (Cigar et al.
2002).
Sub-saharan Africa is a region of opposites and ranks as the world’s poorest and least educated. Our
results reveal that while the region is generally undemocratic, a few countries have established ﬂourishing
democracies. The quantile country eﬀects scatter plots reveal a consistent clustering of countries at both the
0.3 and 0.7 quantiles. This is explained by the presence of long-run factors as opposed to idiosyncratic but
transitory political shocks. Sierra Leone is one of the poorest countries in the entire world, ranking also among
the worst countries in terms of life expectancy and education. Sierra Leone inherited democratic institutions
after independence in the early 1960’s, but political convolution and military coups have been aﬀecting
democracy in the country since the 1970’s. Zimbabwe also inherited democratic institutions around the time
of independence in 1980, but President Mugabe and his Zimbabwe African National Union - Paciﬁc Front’s
(ZANU-PF) systematic violence to political opposition and human rights violations have been aﬀecting
the prospects of democracy. Sierra Leone’s and Zimbabwe’s patterns of democracy are consistent with the
evidence presented in Figure 9.
On the other hand, countries such as Botswana and Gabon ﬁnd themselves at opposite ends of the spectrum
as far as their political development is concerned. Botswana took an unusual route to its current state a of26
vibrant multi-party democracy that explains the almost invariant democracy levels across the quantiles in
Figure 9. Freed from colonial rule in 1966, Botswana was one of the poorest countries in the world. But the
discovery of diamonds in 1971 fueled the economy and generated extended network of government sponsored
social programs which helped maintain the democratic process and encouraged peaceful transitions between
its three presidents Seretse Khama, Ketumile Masire and Festus Mogae. By contrast, Gabon is also a very
resource-rich nation with extensive mineral and oil deposits, yet its politics has been dominated for the past
four decades by Omar Bongo, who runs a corrupt and repressive regime.
Our results in Africa therefore conﬁrm the ﬁndings in the literature that emphasize the success story of
democratic institutions in Botswana (Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson 2003, Robinson and Parsons 2006),
emphasizing that democracy is chieﬂy determined by country-speciﬁc eﬀects and that political development
in Africa cannot be described as emerging from development in the form of increasing income or education.
Also in accordance with the literature that emphasizes the role of natural resources in the political economy
of Africa (Collier and Hoeﬄer 2004, Fearon 2005). By taking into account the country-speciﬁc eﬀects, our
model was able to describe the contrasts that characterize the political development of Africa.
Latin America is a region associated with instability and diversity. Our results show that while some
countries exhibit transitory shifts from democratic to non-democratic forms of government, others remain
democratic most of the time. Chile has been one of the most stable democracies characterized by fair elec-
tions and respect for democratic institutions. However, one of the turning points in the political development
of the region has been September 11, 1973, when Salvador Allende’s socialist government was interrupted
by a military intervention leaded by General Augusto Pinochet. This initiated a brutal regime that lasted
more than 16 years. The repressive regime of General Pinochet is associated to a drop in the (normalized)
Polity measure of democracy from 0.8 in 1973 to 0.15 in 1974. While having traditionally higher levels of
economic development and education than its neighbor Chile, Argentina became an ungovernable, undemo-
cratic society after 1930. President Juan Domingo Per´ on’s administration that lasted 10 years (1945-1955)
was characterized by centralized power and limited civil and political liberties. From 1955 to 1983, the
government wavered from weak democracies to military juntas, which explains the variation of democracy
below the 0.6 quantile in Figure 9.
Latin American countries including Chile and Argentina have become more democratic since the 1980’s,
although several challenges still remain for the region. The experiences of the entire Latin American region
in large part demonstrate the ﬁrst ﬁnding in our paper, which was that hybrid regimes are a highly unstable
state that leads either to collapse of democracy or to consolidation of it. Over the second part of the 20th
century, this has been most obviously the case in Latin America. Once democratic institutions were weakened
in Argentina and Chile, the resulting uncertainty quickly gave way to a rapid rise of authoritarianism.
Similarly, once the institutions of authoritarianism started to weaken, these same countries’ regimes swung27
back to the other extreme of established democracies. The cross-country pattern is however best explained
by focusing on country-speciﬁc eﬀects that our data shows can substantially vary by quantiles of democracy.
East Asia is an example of a region where changing country speciﬁc eﬀects are most easily identiﬁed. The
experiences of China and Taiwan oﬀer one such example (the other being North and South Korea). Around
the time of democratization in Latin America, a transition to democracy started in one of the East Asia
“miracles”, Taiwan, which oﬀered a stunning example of a dual transition both to democracy and to one
of the world’s best performing economies. In 1988, President Lee Teng-hui initiated a series of reforms
to dismantle authoritarian arrangements that years later led to a democratic regime. The transition and
achievement of a more democratic government were associated with the levels of democracy predicted by
the model beyond the 0.7 quantile in Figure 9.
In contrast, the experience of China has been characterized by a lack of democratic institutions despite
unprecedented rates of economic development. In China, country speciﬁc institutions including historical
legacies, culture and formerly-communist structures of power have changed little despite China’s develop-
ment. In our analysis, China emerges as an outlier and its country speciﬁc eﬀects do not change regardless of
what quantile of democracy we look at. In fact, China is unique in our sample of Asian countries where the
country speciﬁc eﬀect remains low as we move from the 0.3 to 0.7 quintile in the conditional distribution of
democracy in the world. This result emphasizes what scholars of Chinese politics and history have referred
to as the persistence of state institutions and Mao’s institutional legacies. For example, the work by Blecher
and Shue (1996) has illustrated the ways in which the post-Mao political economy of China has been shaped
by his long-lasting legacies such as establishment of “model villages” and state-run enterprises in Northern
China. Even slow movements towards more freedom and rights in China have been shaped by the legacies of
the past. In-depth historical studies of Chinese social and political movements have shown that protest and
resistance against authoritarian government is structured by the persistent legacies of the state (Perry 1980,
2002, 2006; Perry and Xun 1997). In fact, even the concept of political rights in China has been shaped
not in line with the classic Western liberal model, but instead by the circumstances and the power of the
Chinese state legacies (O’Brien and Li, 2006; Perry and Goldman 2007).
Our data shows that the Chinese experience with slowly-changing country-speciﬁc factors is not shared by
all Asian countries. Similarly to Taiwan and in contrast to China, South Korea stands out as model a
model democracy. In addition to the history of the Park dictatorship in South Korea, one important fact
that South Korea and Taiwan share is that they both underwent important land reforms that dramatically
redistributed agricultural land, undermining the traditional power of big landowners and opening space for
changing structures of political power. While comparable institutional and economic data does not exist
for the period before the Second World War, our analysis would predict a similar change in country-speciﬁc
institutions for Japan, where land reform also played an important role for setting conditions for the stability
of a democratic system after the war. However, because of the direct American post-war occupation of28
Japan and dramatic changes in its institutions in this period, Japan’s country-speciﬁc factors in our sample
correspond better to the Western European group of countries than to the East Asian.
We conclude this section by cautioning the reader about interpreting our results as overemphasizing the long
run forces which the country eﬀects are proxying for. The estimated quantile speciﬁc eﬀects are capturing
these forces but they also capture many country speciﬁc short run events. It is ultimately the heterogeneous
nature of idiosyncratic political history, which cannot be captured by the economic and demographic variables
included in the structural part of the model. The evidence presented in this section suggests an association
between country-speciﬁc events and country-speciﬁc democratic transitions, which explains the puzzle of
the bimodal distribution of democracy. In order to investigate this idea in more detail, we estimate density
functions for democracy considering the estimates for the conditional quantiles of democracy. We present
the evidence in Figure 10. While the densities for the US and Botswana rank at the top of the democracy
distribution, the densities for Cuba and China, not presented in the graph, rank at the bottom. These
groups of countries obviously generate a bimodality in the democracy distribution. But a large number of
countries, represented here by Greece, Spain, Sierra Leone, Zimbabwe, Chile, Argentina and Taiwan, have
density functions with mass mainly at both the bottom and the top of the democracy distribution. Countries
with volatile and heterogeneous democratic status also contribute to the explanation behind the puzzle of
the bimodal distribution of democracy.
To conclude our brief historical tour, it might perhaps be useful to introduce the notion of democracy as a
“foundational institution,” akin to what political philosophers refer to as “a foundational good.” (Shapiro
1999). While a foundational good is understood as a good that is necessary in order to obtain other goods (as
Shapiro argues that from a justice point of view democracy is a foundational good because it allows pursuit of
other goods we value), democracy can also be understood as an institution that is necessary for other desirable
institutions to ﬂourish. This view is consistent with a power-centered approach to understanding democratic
institutions, most notably associated with Madison and Schumpeter. According to Madison’s famous line in
the Federalist #51, democratic institutions should be structured to allow “ambition to counteract ambition,”
(Hamilton, Jay and Madison [1788] 1987), a balanced and fair party competition in an electoral democracy
can serve to justly allocate political power, protecting individual rights and liberties. Similarly, Joseph
Schumpeter developed in 1941 what he called an economic theory of democracy, arguing that just like ﬁrms
are the major players in a capitalist market, parties should be the major players in a democracy; according
to his “minimalist conception” of democracy, the most just political system is that in which government
power is allocated according to fair multiparty elections (Schumpeter, 2006). An emphasis on multiparty
competition as the basic ingredient of a just pluralist democracy is also made by modern-day theorists such
as Rosenblum (2008), according to whom having a strong party system can help channel the distribution
of power, ambition and even citizen identity. When considering empirical results reported in this paper,
the concept of a minimal procedural democracy as a subordinate foundation good emerges as particularly29
attractive since we ﬁnd that the improvements in these minimal institutional aspects of democracy can
produce fundamental change in country’s long-run characteristics, opening up opportunities for economic
development as well as even better democracy.
The fact that we observe changing country-speciﬁc eﬀects as democracy takes hold is evidence that changing
democratic institutions are associated with a broader set of political and social changes in a country. Simply
put, the best policy for promoting democracy is to focus directly on strengthening procedural and substantive
elements of democracy that include those measured by Polity and the Freedom House scores and range from
fair and free elections, multiparty competition, representative and accountable government, and a full set
of political rights and civil liberties. As regimes improve along these dimensions, our estimation shows that
country-speciﬁc eﬀects also change. Consequently, both for the proponents of democracy and for economists
promoting economic development, a more committed focus on democracy in authoritarian states seems to
be the best policy.
7. Conclusion
This paper reports the ﬁnding that countries have clustered into two separate and opposite regime types
in the second part of the 20th century. The two opposing regime types, authoritarianism and democracy,
both emerge as virtually equally prevalent regime types. This indeed may come as a disappointment for
proponents of democracy from Herodotus to Vaclav Havel and the modern activists still struggling to bring
about revolutions in the world’s remaining dictatorships. At ﬁrst, the persistence of this bimodal distribution
of political regimes seems to be explainable by the peculiar inverted-U relationship between income and
democracy in the cross-section of all countries 1945-1999. When country-speciﬁc eﬀects are left out, hybrid
regimes appear to be particularly unstable, possibly representing an unstable equilibrium, where changes in
the level of economic development have the largest eﬀect, resulting in democracy when countries perform
well and falling back to dictatorships when countries perform poorly.
Our major ﬁnding is changing country-speciﬁc eﬀects hold the key to political development, understood as the
establishment of democratic institutions and all the political rights and civil liberties that come with them.
We found that there is virtually zero eﬀect that economic development can have on political institutions
when democracy is entirely lacking. The clear policy implication of our ﬁnding is that while promoting
wealth and education may be a worthwhile cause on its own, higher levels of development should not be
expected to lead to better political institutions. Country-speciﬁc eﬀects that include the complex milieu of
institutions, historical legacies and culture entirely explain why countries have authoritarian governments.
Perhaps ironically, economic development can have an eﬀect on political institutions only when they already
start to undergo a movement towards democracy. As democracy develops, our results show that country-
speciﬁc eﬀects also start to change. This ﬁnding runs counter to pessimism that may arise once we realize that30
path-dependent historical legacies and entrenched institutions explain virtually all variation in authoritarian
states. To the contrary, when democracy starts to take hold, we observe changes in all other institutions,
opening up space for economic development to start to bear fruit. The more democracy there is, the more
room opens up for income and education to have an eﬀect.
In all, we show that higher income and better education both have strongest eﬀects on political development
at the intermediate levels of democratization and almost non-existent in countries at the extremes. This
relationship is robust to endogeneity and survives diﬀerent identiﬁcation strategies but disappears once we
account for country speciﬁc eﬀects. Only schooling appears to maintain an eﬀect and only in more democratic
countries. In contrast, country-speciﬁc idiosyncratic factors are measured at diﬀerent quantiles and we show
that they are not uniformly important across the distribution of democracy. Cross-country heterogeneity
overwhelms the potential beneﬁts of economic development at the low quantiles of the democracy distribution,
but it diminishes in importance as countries become more democratic. Moreover, the evidence in our sample
points to country speciﬁc eﬀects capturing both long run eﬀects and more recent political shocks.
The present study conducts a very detailed econometric analysis of the complicated relationship between
economic and political development and points to the importance of the relative position of a country
within the political spectrum. By focusing on the comparative levels of development we are not addressing
the related question as to how countries move between political regimes and how certain regimes become
entrenched. A joint analysis of both equilibrium and dynamics of economic development and political
institutions remains an important area of future empirical research.
8. Appendix A: Computational Aspects
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Algorithms available in the quantreg package of the public domain dialect R are based on the previous
representation. See Koenker (2004, chapter 6) for a more extensive discussion.
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Cartesian product of the closed interval [0,1]. Obviously the design matrix is now of large dimension but
the problem can be eﬃciently solved considering the sparse matrix algebra storage used in Koenker (2004).
All programs were written in Matlab and R. The quantile regression method designed to estimate distribu-
tional individual speciﬁc eﬀects solves the dual of the problem formulated in 8.4 considering   =  j. The
instrumental variable quantile regression with country eﬀects is a simple extension of the Chernozhukov and
Hansen (2005) algorithm that includes individual eﬀects as additional covariates. Results and programs are
available upon request.
9. Appendix B: Data Description
The data used in the paper spans the period 1945 to 1999, and consists of all countries for which the ap-
propriate data publicly available. The data used has been compiled by Fearon and Laitin (2003), and is
provided on their website. We have additionally augmented their dataset by including the Barro-Lee educa-
tional achievement variable, available from NBER and the Harvard Center for International Development.
This variable is the percentage of the population with secondary education. In a small number of cases linear
interpolation was employed to avoid unnecessary gaps in the series when it made sense to replace the missing
values with predictions. We measure democracy by the Polity IV score and the Freedom House score, both
of which are discussed extensively in the paper.
All historical and geographic data is from Acemoglu et. al. (2001, 2002). Settler mortality was also collected
by Acemoglu et. al. (2001). Log population density in 1500 was collected by Acemoglu et. al. (2002). These
variables are described in great detail in the above papers.
Additional controls were employed in the sensitivity analysis. Those results were discussed in an earlier
version of the paper but are not reproduced in the current version even though they are mentioned. The
ethnic fractionalization index is the ethnolinguistic fractionalization index originally reported by the Atlas
Naradov Mira and measures the probability that any two individuals in the country speak the same language.
The religious fractionalization index is constructed using the same formula estimating the probability of two
members of the diﬀerent groups being of the same religion. Missing values for the index were imputed using
additional resources such as the CIA Factbook, Encyclopedia Brittanica, the Library of Congress Studies and32
country-speciﬁc sources. The oil exporter dummy variable takes the value 1 if more than 33% if a country’s
exports are based on fossil fuels.
Per capita income is measured in 1985 US dollars and is used in log form, lagged one year. The trade
weighted instrument was computed by Acemoglu et. al. (2008) and uses the IMF trade matrix. The world
factors instruments are computed from log per capita GDP using Principal Components and employing
standard normalizations. The exact procedure is described in the paper.
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Variables Quantiles Mean
0.10 0.25 0.50 0.75 0.90
Polity Measure Pooled Regressions
Log GDP per Capitait−1 0.006 0.035 0.262 0.185 0.071 0.170
(0.003) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004)
Log Population 0.010 0.007 0.010 0.002 -0.004 0.021
(0.002) (0.001) (0.003) (0.002) (0.001) (0.003)
Polity Measure Instrumental Variables Set I
Log GDP per Capitait−1 0.002 0.000 0.369 0.163 0.088 0.222
(0.006) (0.008) (0.667) (0.056) (0.005) (0.007)
Log Population 0.013 0.000 -0.009 -0.016 -0.019 0.004
(0.002) (0.002) (0.247) (0.005) (0.004) (0.003)
Polity Measure Fixed Eﬀects
Log GDP per Capitait−1 0.001 0.006 -0.003 -0.039 -0.073 0.015
(0.017) (0.012) (0.012) (0.017) (0.044) (0.007)
Log Population 0.073 0.076 0.075 0.080 0.107 0.141
(0.032) (0.031) (0.030) (0.031) (0.040) (0.010)
Freedom House Measure Pooled Regressions
Log GDP per Capitait−1 0.073 0.119 0.252 0.213 0.145 0.183
(0.003) (0.007) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Log Population 0.007 0.018 0.001 -0.015 -0.011 0.011
(0.003) (0.005) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.003)
Freedom House Measure Instrumental Variables Set I
Log GDP per Capitait−1 0.069 0.204 0.295 0.217 0.154 0.234
(0.012) (0.047) (0.027) (0.004) (0.005) (0.007)
Log Population 0.004 0.018 -0.016 -0.026 -0.026 0.000
(0.005) (0.008) (0.010) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Freedom House Measure Fixed Eﬀects
Log GDP per Capitait−1 0.075 0.072 0.058 0.028 0.001 0.060
(0.035) (0.035) (0.035) (0.037) (0.038) (0.012)
Log Population 0.072 0.076 0.078 0.075 0.072 0.156
(0.037) (0.037) (0.038) (0.039) (0.039) (0.013)
Table 1. Regression results for the full sample of countries. This sample includes
156 countries and 6220 observations. The instrumental variable set includes log of
mountainous terrain, geographic latitude, and log of air distance to nearest port.
Standard errors in parenthesis.36
Variables Quantiles Mean
0.10 0.25 0.50 0.75 0.90
Polity Measure Pooled Regressions
Log GDP per Capitait−1 -0.005 0.064 0.158 0.108 0.054 0.092
(0.003) (0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.003) (0.008)
Log Population 0.008 0.002 -0.017 -0.007 -0.005 -0.003
(0.000) (0.004) (0.004) (0.002) (0.001) (0.003)
Schooling 0.015 0.044 0.049 0.013 0.001 0.043
(0.001) (0.006) (0.003) (0.002) (0.001) (0.003)
Polity Measure Instrumental Variables Set I
Log GDP per Capitait−1 -0.019 0.007 0.209 0.149 0.134 0.043
(0.087) (0.032) (0.025) (0.023) (0.014) (0.032)
Log Population -0.008 -0.032 -0.029 -0.021 -0.022 -0.028
(0.022) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.003) (0.004)
Schooling 0.034 0.084 0.031 0.006 -0.013 0.060
(0.021) (0.008) (0.009) (0.007) (0.004) (0.009)
Polity Measure Fixed Eﬀects
Log GDP per Capitait−1 -0.027 -0.019 -0.017 -0.074 -0.181 -0.048
(0.045) (0.032) (0.029) (0.038) (0.064) (0.013)
Log Population 0.091 0.093 0.092 0.091 0.123 0.037
(0.063) (0.064) (0.064) (0.065) (0.069) (0.019)
Schooling 0.041 0.034 0.028 0.033 0.037 0.074
(0.022) (0.020) (0.021) (0.023) (0.028) (0.006)
Freedom House Measure Pooled Regressions
Log GDP per Capitait−1 0.030 0.068 0.167 0.164 0.116 0.111
(0.008) (0.011) (0.008) (0.006) (0.004) (0.008)
Log Population -0.020 -0.009 -0.014 -0.018 -0.013 -0.012
(0.003) (0.005) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
Schooling 0.037 0.069 0.035 0.009 0.008 0.041
(0.004) (0.005) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
Freedom House Measure Instrumental Variables Set I
Log GDP per Capitait−1 -0.007 0.244 0.267 0.212 0.173 0.189
(0.023) (0.033) (0.021) (0.156) (0.015) (0.024)
Log Population -0.033 -0.029 -0.029 -0.032 -0.034 -0.029
(0.006) (0.005) (0.004) (0.008) (0.004) (0.004)
Schooling 0.054 0.033 0.005 -0.010 -0.002 0.021
(0.008) (0.011) (0.007) (0.044) (0.004) (0.007)
Freedom House Measure Fixed Eﬀects
Log GDP per Capitait−1 0.063 0.059 0.047 0.005 -0.041 0.011
(0.044) (0.042) (0.041) (0.041) (0.044) (0.017)
Log Population -0.005 -0.009 -0.004 -0.006 -0.009 -0.036
(0.064) (0.065) (0.065) (0.065) (0.065) (0.029)
Schooling 0.035 0.033 0.028 0.034 0.049 0.062
(0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.022) (0.025) (0.007)
Table 2. Regression results of a model with education for the full sample of coun-
tries. This sample includes 110 countries and 4229 observations. The instrumental
variable set includes log of mountainous terrain, geographic latitude, and log of air
distance to nearest port. Standard errors in parenthesis.37
Variables Quantiles
0.10 0.25 0.50 0.75 0.90
Polity Measure Instrumental Variables Set I
Log GDP per Capitait−1 0.002 0.000 0.369 0.163 0.088
(0.006) (0.008) (0.667) (0.056) (0.005)
Log Population 0.013 0.000 -0.009 -0.016 -0.019
(0.002) (0.002) (0.247) (0.005) (0.004)
Polity Measure Instrumental Variable Set II
Log GDP per Capitait−1 0.158 0.126 0.261 0.302 0.000
(0.014) (0.010) (0.013) (0.026) (0.058)
Log Population 0.001 0.000 -0.009 -0.010 0.000
(0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.006) (0.004)
Polity Measure Instrumental Variable Set III
Log GDP per Capitait−1 0.013 0.000 0.178 0.054 0.000
(0.009) (0.015) (0.033) (0.017) (0.011)
Log Population 0.013 0.000 0.049 0.008 0.000
(0.003) (0.002) (0.019) (0.003) (0.002)
Freedom House Measure Instrumental Variables Set I
Log GDP per Capitait−1 0.069 0.204 0.295 0.217 0.154
(0.012) (0.047) (0.027) (0.004) (0.005)
Log Population 0.004 0.018 -0.016 -0.026 -0.026
(0.005) (0.008) (0.010) (0.004) (0.004)
Freedom House Measure Instrumental Variable Set II
Log GDP per Capitait−1 0.141 0.107 0.136 0.170 0.000
(0.010) (0.009) (0.063) (0.020) (0.608)
Log Population -0.004 0.003 -0.007 -0.017 0.000
(0.005) (0.005) (0.009) (0.004) (0.079)
Freedom House Measure Instrumental Variable Set III
Log GDP per Capitait−1 0.086 0.330 0.292 0.390 0.000
(0.021) (0.015) (0.012) (0.030) (0.074)
Log Population 0.014 0.013 -0.007 -0.010 0.000
(0.007) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.011)
Table 3. Sensitivity analysis for the instrumental variables. The ﬁrst set of instru-
ments includes log of mountainous terrain, geographic latitude, log of air distance
to nearest port; the second set of instruments includes trade-weighted world income
as in Acemoglu et. al. (2008); the third set includes the ﬁve instrumental variables
presented in the appendix. Standard errors in parenthesis.38








Distribution of Polity Measure of Democracy
Figure 1. Distribution of the normalized Polity IV score for the period 1945-1999.
Scale 1 represents the highest level of democracy. The continuous line denotes a
kernel density estimate.







Distribution of Freedom House Measure of Democracy
Figure 2. Distribution of the normalized Freedom House (reversed) rating for the
period 1972-1999. Scale 1 represents the highest level of democracy. The continuous
line denotes a kernel density estimate.39












































































































Figure 3. Quantile regression estimates of the eﬀect of income on democracy con-
sidering the full sample of countries. The panels show point estimates obtained by
using quantile regression for the pooled data (QR), instrumental variable with and
without ﬁxed eﬀects (IVFE, IV), and quantile regression with ﬁxed eﬀects assum-
ing that the individual eﬀects are either location shifts (LS) or distributional shifts
(DS). The instrument sets (S1-S3) are described in the paper.40



















































































































































































































































































































Figure 4. Conditional and Unconditional distributions of the measures of democ-
racy. The continuous lines denote kernel density estimates of the unconditional
distribution and the dashed lines show kernel density estimates for the conditional
distribution. The conditioning variables are Income (I) and Schooling (S).41
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Figure 5. Group eﬀect estimates in a model for the Polity IV measure of democ-
racy. The model also includes log of GDP at t-1, log of population, and country
speciﬁc location shifts. The continuous line with dots represents the quantile re-
gression group eﬀects estimates and the shaded grey area represents a .95 pointwise
conﬁdence interval. Groups of countries are deﬁned by comparing the mean level of
the country’s variable to the quartiles of the variable’s distribution (e.g., low school-
ing means that the average schooling is below the 25th percentile). The composition
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Figure 6. Country eﬀect estimates in a model for the Polity IV measure of democ-
racy. The ﬁgure presents results for countries with at least one individual eﬀect
signiﬁcant at 1 percent, in a model that includes log of GDP at t-1 and log of pop-
ulation. The continuous line with dots represents the quantile regression country
eﬀects estimates and the dashed blue line the mean ﬁxed eﬀect. The shaded grey








































































































































































































western democracies and japan
Figure 7. Scatterplot of country eﬀects and democracy levels. The country eﬀects
were estimated at the 0.3 quantile of the conditional distribution of democracy, in
a linear model that includes log of DGP at t − 1, log of population, and schooling.
The dependent variable democracy is constructed based on the Polity measure. See










































































































































































































western democracies and japan
Figure 8. Scatterplot of country eﬀects and democracy levels. The country eﬀects
were estimated at the 0.7 quantile of the conditional distribution of democracy, in
a linear model that includes log of DGP at t − 1, log of population, and schooling.
The dependent variable democracy is constructed based on the Polity measure. See
the appendix for data deﬁnitions.45









































































































































































































































































































Figure 9. Empirical conditional quantiles and quantiles of democracy distribution
for some countries representing diﬀerent regions of the world. For each country, three
lines are presented indicating the quantiles of democracy D (dotted line), the condi-
tional mean ˆ E(D|I,x, ) (dashed line), and the conditional quantiles ˆ QD(τ|I,x, )
(continuous line). The regression models use the country-speciﬁc mean of log of
GDP and log of population as well as country speciﬁc eﬀects.46


































Figure 10. Explaining the puzzle. The ﬁgure shows a density function for the
conditional quantiles of democracy in nine countries representing diﬀerent regions
of the world (black, continuous line). The ﬁgure also shows (rescaled) country-
speciﬁc density functions based on conditional quantiles ˆ QD(τ|I,x, ). The quantile
regression model uses the country-speciﬁc mean of log of GDP and log of population
as well as country speciﬁc eﬀects.The Political Economy of Heterogeneous Development:









Does development lead to the establishment of more democratic institutions? The key to the puzzle, we
argue, is the previously unrecognized fact that based on quantitative regime scores, countries over the past
50 years have clustered into two separate, very distinct, yet equally-common stages of political development
— authoritarian states with low levels of freedom on one side and democracies with liberal institutions on the
other side of a bimodal distribution of political regimes. We develop a new empirical strategy — exploiting
exogenous world economic factors and introducing new panel data estimators — that allows for the ﬁrst time
to estimate the eﬀects of development as well as changing unobserved country eﬀects in driving democracy
at these diﬀerent stages of political development. We ﬁnd that income and education have the least eﬀect
on democracy when authoritarian regimes are consolidated and that only changing country eﬀects, possibly
accounting for institutional legacies, can lead to political development. Ironically, it is in highly democratic
and wealthiest of nations that income and education start to play a role; however greater wealth and better
educated citizenry can both help and hurt democracy depending again on what the country’s institutional
legacies are. Far from accepting the notion that much of the developing world is cursed by unchanging and
poor long-run institutions, policy-makers should take note that with democratization we also see changing
country-speciﬁc factors that in turn condition the diﬀerence income and education make for democracy.
JEL: C13, C23, P16, O10
Keywords: democracy, economic development, quantile regression
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Country Obs From To Country Obs From To
Afghanistan AFG 55 1945 1999 Dominican Rep. DOM 55 1945 1999
Albania ALB 55 1945 1999 Ecuador ECU 55 1945 1999
Algeria DZA 38 1962 1999 Egypt EGY 55 1945 1999
Angola AGO 25 1975 1999 El Salvador SLV 55 1945 1999
Argentina ARG 55 1945 1999 Eritrea ERI 7 1993 1999
Armenia ARM 9 1991 1999 Estonia EST 9 1991 1999
Australia AUS 55 1945 1999 Ethiopia ETH 55 1945 1999
Austria AUT 55 1945 1999 Fiji FJI 30 1970 1999
Azerbaijan AZE 9 1991 1999 Finland FIN 55 1945 1999
Bahrain BHR 29 1971 1999 France FRA 55 1945 1999
Bangladesh BGD 28 1972 1999 Gabon GAB 40 1960 1999
Belarus BLR 9 1991 1999 Gambia GMB 35 1965 1999
Belgium BEL 55 1945 1999 Georgia GEO 9 1991 1999
Benin BEN 40 1960 1999 Germany, Dem. Rep. DEE 42 1949 1990
Bhutan BTN 29 1971 1999 Germany, Fed. Rep. DEW 55 1945 1999
Bolivia BOL 55 1945 1999 Ghana GHA 43 1957 1999
Bosnia BIH 8 1992 1999 Greece GRC 55 1945 1999
Botswana BWA 34 1966 1999 Guatemala GTM 55 1945 1999
Brazil BRA 55 1945 1999 Guinea GIN 42 1958 1999
Bulgaria BGR 55 1945 1999 Guinea Bissau GNB 26 1974 1999
Burkina Faso BFA 40 1960 1999 Guyana GUY 34 1966 1999
Burma BRM 52 1948 1999 Haiti HTI 55 1945 1999
Burundi BDI 38 1962 1999 Honduras HND 55 1945 1999
Cambodia KHM 47 1953 1999 Hungary HUN 55 1945 1999
Cameroon CMR 40 1960 1999 India IND 53 1947 1999
Canada CAN 55 1945 1999 Indonesia IDN 51 1949 1999
Central African Rep. CAF 40 1960 1999 Iran IRN 55 1945 1999
Chad TCD 40 1960 1999 Iraq IRQ 55 1945 1999
Chile CHL 55 1945 1999 Ireland IRL 55 1945 1999
China CHN 55 1945 1999 Israel ISR 52 1948 1999
Colombia COL 55 1945 1999 Italy ITA 55 1945 1999
Congo ZAR 40 1960 1999 Ivory Coast CIV 40 1960 1999
Costa Rica CRI 55 1945 1999 Jamaica JAM 38 1962 1999
Croatia HRV 8 1992 1999 Japan JPN 55 1945 1999
Cuba CUB 55 1945 1999 Jordan JOR 54 1946 1999
Cyprus CYP 40 1960 1999 Kazakhstan KAZ 9 1991 1999
Czechoslovakia CZV 48 1945 1992 Kenya KEN 37 1963 1999
Czech, Rep CZE 7 1993 1999 S. Korea PPK 51 1949 1999
Congo, Dem. Rep. COG 40 1960 1999 Kuwait KWT 39 1961 1999
Denmark DNK 55 1945 1999 Kyrgyzstan KGZ 9 1991 1999
Djibouti DJI 23 1977 1999 Laos LAO 47 1953 1999
Table 1. Sample of Countries.3
Country Obs From To Country Obs From To
Latvia LVA 9 1991 1999 Sierra Leone SLE 39 1961 1999
Lebanon LBN 54 1946 1999 Singapore SGP 35 1965 1999
Lesotho LSO 34 1966 1999 Slovakia SVK 7 1993 1999
Liberia LBR 55 1945 1999 Slovenia SVN 8 1992 1999
Libya LBY 49 1951 1999 Somalia SOM 40 1960 1999
Lithuania LTU 9 1991 1999 South Africa ZAF 55 1945 1999
Macedonia MKD 7 1993 1999 Spain ESP 55 1945 1999
Madagascar MDG 40 1960 1999 Sri Lanka LKA 52 1948 1999
Malawi MWI 36 1964 1999 Sudan SDN 44 1956 1999
Malaysia MYS 43 1957 1999 Swaziland SWZ 32 1968 1999
Mali MLI 40 1960 1999 Sweden SWE 55 1945 1999
Mauritania MRT 40 1960 1999 Switzerland CHE 55 1945 1999
Mauritius MUS 32 1968 1999 Syria SYR 54 1946 1999
Mexico MEX 55 1945 1999 Taiwan TWN 51 1949 1999
Moldova MDA 9 1991 1999 Tajikistan TJK 9 1991 1999
Mongolia MNG 55 1945 1999 Tanzania TZA 39 1961 1999
Morocco MAR 44 1956 1999 Thailand THA 55 1945 1999
Mozambique MOZ 25 1975 1999 Togo TGO 40 1960 1999
N. Korea KOR 52 1948 1999 Trinidad & Tobago TTO 38 1962 1999
Namibia NAM 10 1990 1999 Tunisia TUN 44 1956 1999
Nepal NPL 55 1945 1999 Turkey TUR 55 1945 1999
Netherlands NLD 55 1945 1999 Turkmenistan TKM 9 1991 1999
New Zealand NZL 55 1945 1999 United Arab Emirates ARE 29 1971 1999
Nicaragua NIC 55 1945 1999 Uganda UGA 38 1962 1999
Niger NER 40 1960 1999 UK GBR 55 1945 1999
Nigeria NGA 40 1960 1999 Ukraine UKR 9 1991 1999
Norway NOR 55 1945 1999 Uruguay URY 55 1945 1999
Oman OMN 29 1971 1999 USA USA 55 1945 1999
Pakistan PAK 53 1947 1999 Uzbekistan UZB 9 1991 1999
Panama PAN 55 1945 1999 Venezuela VEN 55 1945 1999
Papua Nueva Guinea PNG 25 1975 1999 Vietnam VNM 46 1954 1999
Paraguay PRY 55 1945 1999 Vietnam, S. VNS 22 1954 1975
Peru PER 55 1945 1999 Yemen YEM 10 1990 1999
Philippines PHL 54 1946 1999 Yemen, Arab. Rep. YEA 46 1945 1990
Poland POL 55 1945 1999 Yemen, Peop. Rep. YEP 24 1967 1990
Portugal PRT 55 1945 1999 Yugoslavia YUG 55 1945 1999
Romania ROM 55 1945 1999 Zambia ZMB 36 1964 1999
Russia RUS 55 1945 1999 Zimbabwe ZWE 35 1965 1999
Rwanda RWA 38 1962 1999
Saudi Arabia SAU 55 1945 1999
Senegal SEN 40 1960 1999
Table 2. Sample of Countries (Cont.).4
Variables Sample of Countries
All West E. Europe & Latin Sub-saharan Asia
countries & Japan Soviet Union America Africa
Polity Measure 0.476 0.931 0.325 0.537 0.313 0.409
of Democracy (0.376) (0.217) (0.314) (0.335) (0.284) (0.332)
Freedom House Measure 0.465 0.955 0.416 0.587 0.287 0.374
of Democracy (0.333) (0.107) (0.309) (0.264) (0.236) (0.279)
Log of GDP per 7.660 8.939 7.684 7.780 6.772 7.129
capita (1.054) (0.591) (0.884) (0.595) (0.630) (0.803)
Log of Population 9.049 9.595 9.431 8.643 8.500 9.923
(1.457) (1.213) (1.223) (1.218) (1.211) (1.761)
Schooling 4.631 7.915 7.978 4.095 2.057 3.626
(2.911) (2.085) (1.508) (1.672) (1.481) (2.282)
Log of mountainous 2.177 1.991 1.931 2.645 1.558 2.818
terrain (1.404) (1.435) (1.295) (1.204) (1.435) (1.205)
Absolute geographic 0.291 0.533 0.536 0.175 0.131 0.244
latitude (0.189) (0.107) (0.062) (0.097) (0.084) (0.140)
Log of air distance from 7.958 6.628 7.251 8.356 8.695 8.223
capital to nearest port (0.969) (1.156) (0.658) (0.437) (0.240) (0.494)
Settler Mortality 211.1 8.938 - 88.159 460.2 90.40
(395.1) (5.265) (32.048) (588.5) (51.81)
Population Density 6.998 15.044 11.797 1.282 3.378 10.032
in 1500 (9.712) (13.363) (10.434) (0.894) (5.169) (10.657)
Trade-Weighted World 10.761 11.377 8.466 10.501 9.396 13.455
Income (8.049) (4.784) (2.169) (6.143) (5.166) (16.649)
Instrumental Variable 1 -1.923 -3.236 -1.716 -1.610 -1.135 -1.955
(4.745) (3.251) (5.317) (4.588) (5.482) (4.658)
Instrumental Variable 2 -5.072 -4.540 -5.230 -4.794 -6.022 -4.281
(6.232) (6.019) (5.545) (6.049) (6.487) (6.747)
Instrumental Variable 3 10.072 9.789 11.805 10.156 9.425 9.946
(6.050) (4.802) (5.584) (4.857) (8.205) (5.696)
Instrumental Variable 4 -3.010 -3.356 -0.509 -3.329 -3.262 -3.271
(7.242) (6.667) (7.951) (6.788) (7.757) (7.056)
Instrumental Variable 5 34.308 30.767 35.223 32.036 38.437 33.985
(13.051) (13.751) (13.831) (13.791) (10.315) (13.033)
Table 3. Descriptive Statistics.5
Variables Quantiles Mean
0.10 0.25 0.50 0.75 0.90
Polity Measure Pooled Regressions
Log GDP per Capitait−1 0.092 0.246 0.278 0.158 0.059 0.227
(0.011) (0.012) (0.010) (0.019) (0.005) (0.014)
Log Population -0.002 0.007 -0.005 -0.006 -0.004 0.002
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.001) (0.016)
Polity Measure Instrumental Variables
Log GDP per Capitait−1 0.000 0.000 0.147 0.290 0.000 0.145
(0.071) (0.047) (0.059) (0.122) (0.393) (0.049)
Log Population 0.000 0.000 -0.003 -0.008 0.000 0.002
(0.007) (0.009) (0.010) (0.015) (0.006) (0.007)
Polity Measure Fixed Eﬀects
Log GDP per Capitait−1 0.020 0.016 0.012 -0.012 -0.058 -0.023
(0.030) (0.029) (0.030) (0.029) (0.035) (0.032)
Log Population 0.086 0.089 0.088 0.088 0.090 0.074
(0.040) (0.040) (0.039) (0.039) (0.038) (0.061)
Freedom House Measure Pooled Regressions
Log GDP per Capitait−1 0.193 0.302 0.269 0.199 0.091 0.234
(0.012) (0.012) (0.010) (0.011) (0.010) (0.012)
Log Population 0.002 -0.001 -0.012 -0.019 -0.009 -0.008
(0.003) (0.007) (0.005) (0.003) (0.002) (0.011)
Freedom House Measure Instrumental Variables
Log GDP per Capitait−1 0.000 0.135 0.201 0.000 0.000 0.146
(0.110) (0.044) (0.087) (0.445) (0.298) (0.046)
Log Population 0.000 0.001 -0.017 0.000 0.000 -0.009
(0.012) (0.011) (0.006) (0.029) (0.029) (0.005)
Freedom House Measure Fixed Eﬀects
Log GDP per Capitait−1 0.103 0.092 0.070 0.036 0.005 0.016
(0.039) (0.034) (0.033) (0.034) (0.036) (0.030)
Log Population -0.025 -0.013 -0.010 -0.009 -0.015 -0.103
(0.032) (0.031) (0.031) (0.030) (0.030) (0.059)
Table 4. Sensitivity analysis using the 5-year data in Acemoglu et. al. (2008). The
instrument for income is trade weighted world income. Year eﬀects are included in
all the regressions. Standard errors in parenthesis.6
Country Educ Income Settler Pop Country Educ Income Settler Pop
Mortality Density Mortality Density
AFG Low Low M-High M-Low DOM M-Low M-Low M-High M-Low
ALB - Low - M-High ECU M-High M-Low M-Low M-Low
DZA Low M-High M-High Low EGY M-Low M-Low Low M-High
AGO - Low High M-Low SLV M-Low M-Low M-Low M-Low
ARG M-High High Low Low ERI - - - M-Low
ARM - M-High - M-High EST High M-High - Low
AUS High High Low Low ETH Low Low Low M-Low
AUT High High - High FJI M-High M-High Low
AZE - M-Low - M-High FIN High High - Low
BHR M-Low High - M-Low FRA M-High High Low High
BGD Low M-Low M-Low High GAB - M-High High M-Low
BLR - M-High - Low GMB Low Low High M-High
BEL High High - High GEO - M-Low - M-High
BEN Low M-Low High M-High DEE High High - High
BTN - Low - - DEW High High - High
BOL M-High M-Low M-Low Low GHA M-Low Low High M-High
BIH - - - High GRC M-High M-High - M-High
BWA M-Low M-Low - Low GTM Low M-Low M-Low M-Low
BRA M-Low M-High M-Low Low GIN - Low High M-High
BGR High M-Low - M-High GNB - Low M-High M-High
BFA - Low High M-High GUY M-High M-Low Low Low
BRM Low Low Low M-High HTI Low Low M-High M-Low
BDI Low Low High High HND M-Low M-Low M-Low M-Low
KHM - Low - High HUN High M-High - High
CMR Low M-Low High M-Low IND M-Low Low Low High
CAN High High Low Low IDN M-Low M-Low M-High M-High
CAF Low Low High M-Low IRN Low M-High - M-Low
TCD - Low High Low IRQ Low M-High - M-Low
CHL M-High M-High Low Low IRL High High - High
CHN M-High Low M-High High ISR High High - M-High
COL M-Low M-High M-Low Low ITA M-High High - High
ZAR M-Low M-Low M-High M-Low CIV - M-Low High M-High
CRI M-High M-High M-Low M-Low JAM M-Low M-High M-High M-High
HRV M-High - - High JPN High High - High
CUB M-High M-High - Low JOR M-Low M-Low - M-High
CYP M-High High - - KAZ High M-High - Low
CZV High M-High High KEN M-Low Low M-High M-High
CZE High M-High - High PPK M-High M-High M-High High
COG - Low M-High M-Low KWT M-High High - M-Low
DNK High High - High KGZ - M-Low - Low
DJI - M-Low Low - LAO - Low M-High M-Low
Table 5. Groups by education, income, settler mortality, and population density
in 1500. Low means that the country average is below the 25th percentile, M-
Low between the 25th and 50th percentiles, M-High between the 50th and 75th
percentiles, and High above the 75th percentile.7
Country Educ Income Settler Pop Country Educ Income Settler Pop
Mortality Density Mortality Density
LVA High M-High - M-Low SLE Low M-Low High M-High
LBN - M-High - M-High SGP M-High High Low Low
LSO M-Low Low - Low SVK High M-High - High
LBR Low Low High M-High SVN High - - M-High
LBY Low M-High - Low SOM - Low - M-Low
LTU High M-High - M-Low ZAF M-High M-High Low Low
MKD - - - High ESP M-High High - High
MDG - Low High M-Low LKA M-High M-Low M-Low High
MWI M-Low Low - Low SDN Low Low M-High M-Low
MYS M-High M-High Low M-Low SWZ M-Low M-High - Low
MLI Low Low High Low SWE High High - M-Low
MRT Low Low High Low CHE High High - High
MUS M-High M-High Low Low SYR M-Low M-High - M-High
MEX M-Low M-High M-Low M-High TWN M-High M-High -
MDA High M-Low - M-Low TJK High M-Low - Low
MNG - M-Low - Low TZA - Low High M-Low
MAR - M-Low M-High M-High THA M-High M-Low M-High M-High
MOZ Low Low - M-Low TGO Low Low High M-High
KOR - M-High - TTO M-High High M-High M-Low
NAM - M-High - Low TUN Low M-Low Low M-High
NPL Low Low - High TUR M-Low M-High - High
NLD High High - High TKM - M-High - Low
NZL High High Low Low ARE M-Low High - M-Low
NIC M-Low M-Low M-High M-Low UGA Low Low High M-High
NER Low Low High Low GBR High High Low High
NGA - Low High M-High UKR - M-High - M-Low
NOR High High - M-Low URY M-High M-High M-Low
OMN - High - M-Low USA High High Low Low
PAK Low Low Low High UZB - M-High - Low
PAN M-High M-High M-High M-Low VEN M-Low High M-Low Low
PNG Low M-Low M-High M-Low VNM M-Low M-Low M-High M-High
PRY M-High M-Low M-Low Low VNS - Low M-High M-High
PER M-High M-High M-Low M-Low YEM - M-Low - M-High
PHL M-High M-Low - M-Low YEA - Low Low M-High
POL High M-High - High YEP - M-High - M-High
PRT M-Low M-High - High YUG M-High M-High - High
ROM High Low - High ZMB M-Low Low - Low
RUS High M-High - M-Low ZWE M-Low M-Low - Low
RWA Low Low High High
SAU - High - Low
SEN Low M-Low M-High M-High
Table 6. Groups by education, income, settler mortality, and population density
in 1500. Low means that the country average is below the 25th percentile, M-
Low between the 25th and 50th percentiles, M-High between the 50th and 75th
percentiles, and High above the 75th percentile. (Cont.)8
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Figure 1. Country eﬀect estimates in a model for the Polity IV measure of democ-
racy. The ﬁgure presents results for countries with at least one individual eﬀect
signiﬁcant at 1 percent, in a model that includes log of GDP at t-1, log of popula-
tion, and schooling. The continuous line with dots represents the quantile regression
country eﬀects estimates and the dashed blue line the mean ﬁxed eﬀect. The shaded
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Figure 2. Country ﬁxed eﬀect estimates in a model for the Freedom House measure
of democracy. The ﬁgure presents results for countries with at least one individual
eﬀect signiﬁcant at 1 percent, in a model that includes log of GDP at t-1 and log of
population. The continuous line with dots represents the quantile regression ﬁxed
eﬀects estimates and the dashed blue line the mean ﬁxed eﬀect. The shaded grey
area represents a pointwise conﬁdence interval.10
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Figure 3. Country ﬁxed eﬀect estimates in a model for the Freedom House measure
of democracy. The ﬁgure presents results for countries with at least one individual
eﬀect signiﬁcant at 1 percent, in a model that includes log of GDP at t-1, log of
population, and schooling. The continuous line with dots represents the quantile
regression ﬁxed eﬀects estimates and the dashed blue line the mean ﬁxed eﬀect. The
shaded grey area represents a pointwise conﬁdence interval.11




























































































































































Figure 4. Quantile regression estimates of the eﬀect of education on democracy
considering the full sample of countries. The panels show point estimates obtained
by using quantile regression for the pooled data (QR), instrumental variable with and
without ﬁxed eﬀects (IVFE, IV), and quantile regression with ﬁxed eﬀects assuming
that the individual eﬀects are either location shifts (LS) or distributional shifts (DS).
The instrument sets (S1-S3) are described in Table 3.12




































































Figure 5. More evidence on the distributional eﬀect of income on democracy. The
sample includes countries with positive standard deviation of democracy. The panels
show point estimates obtained by using quantile regression for the pooled data (QR),
instrumental variable with and without ﬁxed eﬀects (IVFE, IV), and quantile regres-
sion with ﬁxed eﬀects assuming that the individual eﬀects are either location shifts
(LS) or distributional shifts (DS). The instrument set S2 includes trade-weighted
world income as in Acemoglu et. al. (2008).13







































































































































































































western democracies and japan
Figure 6. Scatterplot of country eﬀects and income. The country eﬀects were
estimated at the 0.3 quantile of the conditional distribution of democracy, in a
linear model that includes log of DGP at t−1 and log of population. The dependent
variable democracy is constructed based on the Polity measure. See the Appendix
for data deﬁnitions.14









































































































































































































western democracies and japan
Figure 7. Scatterplot of country eﬀects and income. The country eﬀects were
estimated at the 0.7 quantile of the conditional distribution of democracy, in a
linear model that includes log of DGP at t−1 and log of population. The dependent
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western democracies and japan
Figure 8. Scatterplot of country eﬀects and average years of schooling. The coun-
try eﬀects were estimated at the 0.3 quantile of the conditional distribution of democ-
racy, in a linear model that includes log of DGP at t − 1, log of population, and
schooling. The dependent variable democracy is constructed based on the Polity



































































































































































western democracies and japan
Figure 9. Scatterplot of country eﬀects and average years of schooling. The coun-
try eﬀects were estimated at the 0.7 quantile of the conditional distribution of democ-
racy, in a linear model that includes log of DGP at t − 1, log of population, and
schooling. The dependent variable democracy is constructed based on the Polity
measure. See the Appendix for data deﬁnitions.